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This special issue collects a selection of the papers presented at the 
International Colloquium Word and Object, 50 Years Later, which took 
place in Rome on May 28-29, 2010. In the fiftieth year since the 
publication of Word and Object, the conference aimed at celebrating 
one of the most famous and influential philosophers and mathemati-
cians of the 20th Century: Willard Van Orman Quine. The purpose of 
the conference, organised by the University of Rome ‘La Sapienza’ 
and the Research Group APhEx (Analytical and Philosophical Expla-
nation), was to discuss and explore some of the major Quinean the-
ses. This volume collects the contributions of Marianna Antonutti 
Marfori, Jacob Busch & Andrea Sereni, Alberto Voltolini, Stephen 
White, and Giancarlo Zanet, who were speakers at the conference. 
The papers are unified by a common thread that is represented by the 
Quinean philosophical heritage and take their stance within the differ-
ent areas of the current philosophical debate on this issue. 
Quinean theses marked several fields of philosophy and, since its 
publication, Word and Object has become a landmark in the canon of 
analytical philosophy. During the two-day conference, at least three 
subjects came to the foreground, especially for their potential to still 
unveil, after half a century, some common prejudices in the philoso-
phy of language. First, the thesis of indeterminacy of translation, 
which questioned the definition of the object of translation itself, the 
notion of a translation manual and the concept of translation equiva-
lence. Second, Quine’s holistic view of language, which highlighted 
the problem of determining the locus (if any) and the function of the 
units constitutive of meaning. As is well known, Quine came to 
doubt the very notion of meaning on account of his holistic view. 
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Holism, the view that the sentences of a language have to face the 
“tribunal of experience” together, has still a deep influence on the 
philosophical understanding of the way language is connected to 
reality. Third, his thesis of the inscrutability of reference puzzled 
analytical philosophers on the nature of their ontological commit-
ments, the criteria of identity of extension, the role of conceptual 
schemes, etc. and put into question the validity of the very notion of 
reference.  
However, the Quinean contribution is not limited to the philoso-
phy of language. His work sheds light on many important topics in the 
philosophy of mind and the philosophy of mathematics. He is cele-
brated for introducing a naturalised conception of epistemology, 
which emphasised the role of the natural scientific method in deter-
mining the processes of knowledge acquisition. On the one hand, this 
view brought him to embrace behaviourism, the thesis that psycho-
logical terms do not refer to inner mental states and instead are to be 
analysed in terms of speakers’ dispositions to verbal behaviour. On 
the other hand, he rejected the traditional philosophical study of 
scientific knowledge and mathematics in particular, because of its 
failure to reduce mathematics to pure logic.  
The papers presented in this volume show that Quine’s philosophy 
is not yet a matter for history, but on the contrary has marked a path 
of inquiry still resourceful nowadays: his indispensability argument in 
mathematics, his critique of modal logic, his conception of naturalism 
and the ways it is applied in contemporary philosophy of mind, and 
his remarks on the notion of translation. Marianna Antonutti Mar-
fori’s paper (‘Naturalising Mathematics: A Critical Look at the 
Quine-Maddy Debate’) focuses on the possibility of naturalising 
mathematical practice and offers a positive attempt to elucidate 
Penelope Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in a Quinean 
perspective. As it is known, according to Quine, mathematics is part 
of our best overall theory of the world because it is indispensable to 
scientific theories. Confirmational holism guarantees that indispensa-
ble mathematics is empirically confirmed in virtue of its successful 
application in scientific practice. This view entails the so-called Indis-
pensability Argument (which seeks to establish the conclusion that we 
ought to believe in the existence of entities, i.e. mathematical enti-
ties, that are indispensable to scientific theories). According to this 
Quinean line of argument, it follows that unapplied mathematics has 
to be rejected as frivolous and we should adopt a strong revisionary 
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approach to mathematical practice. Maddy argues against such a 
position. An important motivation behind her view is to account for 
the methodological autonomy of mathematics. In her paper, Anto-
nutti Marforiillustrates Maddy’s position in detail in order to assess 
whether it can accommodate an anti-revisionary stance on mathemat-
ics within Quinean naturalism. More specifically, Antonutti explains 
Maddy’s grounds for rejecting the conclusion of the Indispensability 
Argument while maintaining that mathematics is indispensable to 
science. She then shows how Maddy can avoid the objection that her 
view entails that mathematics and pseudo-science are on a par, and 
reformulates the objection so that it cannot be avoided. Finally, 
Antonutti argues that Maddy’s view faces a dilemma, and ultimately 
fails to account for the methodological autonomy of mathematics 
within Quinean naturalism.  
The paper by Jacob Busch and Andrea Sereni, (‘Indispensability 
Arguments and their Quinean Heritage’), also focuses on philosophy 
of mathematics. It concerns the Indispensability Arguments for 
mathematical Platonism in connection with Quine’s thesis. Quine’s 
Indispensability Argument for mathematics is considered by many to 
be the strongest argument for mathematical realism: mathematical 
entities (i.e. sets, numbers, functions, etc.) are indispensable to our 
best scientific theories, therefore we ought to be ontologically com-
mitted to their existence. Bush and Sereni present some of the most 
discussed versions of the Indispensability Argument and show both 
theoretical and exegetical problems with Quine’s view. They propose 
a different approach to indispensability that emphasizes the theoretical 
contributions of mathematics and Quine’s remarks on unobservable 
entities. They suggest two minimal versions of indispensability, which 
they label the ‘logical’ and the ‘theory-contribution’ points of view. 
From the logical point of view, the notion of indispensability is under-
stood in terms of the expressive power of theories: mathematics is 
indispensable to science because of nominalised theories. From the 
theory-contribution point of view, mathematical entities contribute 
to scientific theories in relevantly similar ways as theoretical entities 
do. The minimal version of indispensability they propose is an in-
stance of the Inference to the Best Explanation. 
Alberto Voltolini’s paper (‘All the existences that there are’) con-
cerns the question whether existence has to be taken either as a first-
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order or as a second-order property. He proposes a three-fold notion 
of existence: as a second-order property, typically expressed by the 
particular quantifier; as a substantive first-order property of individuals, 
i.e. having a certain weight, being human, being Italian; and as a 
blanket property of individuals, i.e. the property of being (identical 
with) something. Voltolini explains what these properties are and 
why we need them all for our ontological purposes. Relying on this 
assumption, he vindicates a Meinongian position that endorses both 
first-order properties by giving arguments in favour of this view as the 
correct position in ontology; he further explores the limits of linguis-
tic approaches to the ontology of existence, by means of a descriptive 
analysis of the behaviour of “there is” and “exists”. 
In ‘The indeterminacy of translation: Fifty years later’, Stephen 
White offers a critical perspective on Quine’s thesis of indeterminacy 
of translation. White presents Quine’s well-known ‘Gavagai’ mental 
experiment and shows the difficulties that arise when we want to 
equate referring expressions or predicates in the language being 
translated and our own. In his thought experiment of radical transla-
tion, Quine proposes a situation in which both the linguist and the 
native speaker see a rabbit. Quine imagines that the native speaker 
pronounces ‘Gavagai’ in seeing the rabbit, and that the linguist no-
tices this behaviour whenever the rabbit is present. In observing a 
strong correlation between the presence of a rabbit and the expres-
sion ‘Gavagai’ pronounced by the native speaker, the linguist will 
infer that ‘Gavagai’ means ‘rabbit’: ‘Gavagai’ is a one-word sentence 
with the same stimulus meaning as our sentence ‘There is a rabbit’. In 
fact, the meaning of a sentence as a stimulus to verbal behaviour is 
defined by what type of response it arouses in the native. Namely, 
stimulus meaning is a good approximation to meaning, as it is intui-
tively understood. However – Quine argues – if the linguist assigns 
the term ‘Gavagai’ to rabbits, it does not mean that the native could 
not use that term to refer to a ’rabbit-stage’ or a ‘rabbit-phase’. If this 
were so, ‘Gavagai’ could refer, for example, to an ‘undetached rabbit 
part’. According to the Quinean thesis of inscrutability of reference, 
equally correct translation manuals might translate the same words 
using completely different references. Therefore, as White points 
out, the difficulty arises because we can associate ‘Gavagai’, con-
strued as a term, with two very different terms in English and pre-
serve the stimulus meaning of ‘Gavagai’ construed as a one-word 
sentence. Thus, White explores whether non-trivial examples of 
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indeterminacy are achievable by considering some objections to the 
appeal to verbal dispositions in characterising meaning and offers an 
alternative framework.  
In ‘Quine and the Contemporary Debate on Mindreading’, Gian-
carlo Zanet explores the main features of Quine’s account of mind-
reading within the current debate between theory-theorists, rational-
ity-theorists, and hybrid-theorists. The concern is with the broad 
issue of how to characterize the way we understand people and how 
we attribute to them propositional attitudes (i.e. beliefs, desires, and 
intentions). Moreover, he points out that the role that folk psychol-
ogy plays in Quine’s philosophy is crucial. Such a role enlightens the 
difference between Quine and Davidson on rationality. According to 
Zanet, a theory of rationality can be captured in a Quinean perspec-
tive if we take him as a proponent of a kind of hybrid theory, a blend 
of theory-theory and simulation. In conclusion, he proposes a blend 
of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain mind-
reading in a Quinean context. 
We would like to conclude this brief introduction by thanking the 
authors of the papers collected in this volume for their willingness to 
cooperate during the whole review process. We also thank all 
the participants at the conference “Word and Object, 50 years later”, 
the Organising Committee (Marianna Antonutti Marfori, Daniele 
Santoro, Stefano Vaselli, Pierluigi Graziani, Carlo Tatasciore, Stefano 
Poggi and the Italian Society for Philosophy) and the Scientific Com-
mittee (Massimiliano Carrara, Carlo Cellucci, Roberto Cord-
eschi, Mario De Caro, Leon Horsten, Teresa Marques, Marco San-
tambrogio, Celia Teixeira). We are grateful to the Editorial Commit-
tee of Disputatio, the editors Teresa Marques and João Branquinho, 
for all the support given to the publication of this volume. Last but 
not least, we profoundly appreciate the efforts of the referees in 
reviewing the papers. Without their help, this special issue would not 
exist. 
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Abstract 
This paper considers Maddy’s strategy for naturalising mathematics in 
the context of Quine’s scientific naturalism. The aim of this proposal is 
to account for the acceptability of mathematics on scientific grounds 
without committing to revisionism about mathematical practice entailed 
by the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument. It has been argued that 
Maddy’s mathematical naturalism makes inconsistent assumptions on the 
role of mathematics in scientific explanations to the effect that it cannot 
distinguish mathematics from pseudo-science. I shall clarify Maddy’s ar-
guments and show that the objection can be overcome. I shall then re-
formulate a novel version of the objection and consider a possible an-
swer, and I shall conclude that mathematical naturalism does not ulti-
mately provide a viable strategy for accommodating an anti-revisionary 
stance on mathematics within a Quinean naturalist framework. 
 
Keywords 
Quinean scientific naturalism, confirmational holism, indispensability 
argument, revisionism, mathematical naturalism. 
Introduction* 
In Second Philosophy. A Naturalistic Method (2007), Penelope Maddy 
puts forward a naturalised account of mathematics which purports to 
 
* Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the conferences Word and Ob-
ject, 50 Years Later and SIFA 2010. I thank both audiences – and particularly Jacob 
Busch, Sthatis Psillos and Andrea Sereni – for interesting questions. Many thanks to 
Leon Horsten and two anonymous referees for this Journal for helpful comments. I 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Department of Philosophy of the 
University of Bristol. 
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do justice to the special status of mathematics while maintaining a 
Quinean naturalist framework.  
Quinean Scientific Naturalism can be characterised as the thesis that 
science is not answerable to any extra-scientific tribunal and is the 
ultimate arbiter of truth. In Quine’s words, ‘it is within science itself, 
and not in some prior philosophy, that reality is to be identified and 
described’ (1981: 21). According to Quinean scientific naturalism, 
mathematics is part of our overall theory of the world and, as such, is 
continuous with science both on the ontological and methodological 
level; our best scientific theories dictate both what we should include 
in our ontology, and what are the legitimate ways of enquiring into 
the natural world.  
Quinean naturalists are committed to the so-called Quine-Putnam 
indispensability argument, according to which we ought to commit to 
the existence of all and only those entities that are indispensable to 
our best scientific theories. A significant consequence of this view for 
mathematics is that only those bits of mathematics which actually 
figure in our best scientific theories should be regarded as justified. 
This consequence is taken to be problematic because it implies a 
revisionary stance towards mathematical practice. That is, it implies 
that certain aspects of mathematical practice, namely those that do 
not (aim to) contribute to our best scientific theories, are not legiti-
mate. 
Such an undesirable consequence is what motivates Maddy to re-
ject the indispensability argument and to propose a novel strategy for 
the naturalisation of mathematics. Maddy’s naturalism is a particularly 
attractive position because it seems to constitute the only option 
available to a Quinean naturalist who is uncomfortable with both 
revisionism about mathematical practice and a nominalist stance on 
mathematics. The guiding strategy of Maddy’s mathematical naturalist 
is to avoid the commitment to revisionism by rejecting the conclusion 
of the indispensability argument, while at the same time maintaining 
that mathematics plays a crucial role in our understanding of the 
world because it is indispensable to scientific practice.  
The aim of this paper is to assess whether there is a viable way of 
combining Quinean scientific naturalism with Maddy’s non-
revisionary stance towards mathematical practice. The structure of 
the paper is the following. In the first section I present the standard 
version of the indispensability argument and Quine’s revisionism 
about mathematical practice, and make a few remarks on some mat-
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ters of interest in the context of the present discussion. I then present 
Maddy’s own view on the indispensability argument and her solution 
to avoid revisionism. Her position is subtle, so it is important to 
consider Maddy’s objections to the indispensability argument, and her 
motivations for her positive view of mathematics, in detail. In the 
third section an important objection against mathematical naturalism 
made by Dieterle (1999) is considered, and it is argued that the 
objection is not conclusive. In the following section I outline Maddy’s 
reply and show how it could successfully counter Dieterle’s objection 
if cashed out in more detail. The analysis will suggest that Maddy’s 
reply crucially relies on indispensability considerations but leaves the 
appeal to indispensability unargued, so I shall formulate a new objec-
tion which is more charitable to mathematical naturalism. Finally, in 
section five, I shall outline a possible response on behalf of the 
mathematical naturalist and I shall argue that such a strategy is not 
available to the mathematical naturalist due to an underlying tension 
in Maddy’s position. I shall conclude that this tension leads to a 
dilemma that forces the mathematical naturalist to either embrace 
Quinean scientific naturalism along with a revisionary stance on 
mathematical practice, or to accept the undesirable consequence of 
mathematics being indistinguishable from pseudo-science. Either 
way, the moral to be drawn is that Maddy’s mathematical naturalism 
is not a viable way of combining anti-revisionism about mathematical 
practice and Quinean scientific naturalism. 
Naturalism and Indispensability  
A standard characterisation of the indispensability argument is given 
by Colyvan (2001): 
1. We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only 
those entities that are indispensable to our best scientific 
theories 
2. Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific 
theories 
Therefore, 
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3. We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical enti-
ties. 
The thesis that we ought to commit to the truth of the statements 
that feature in our best scientific theories taken at face value (prem-
ise1) is scientific realism. In a Quinean framework, scientific realism 
results from the conjunction of (i) Quinean scientific naturalism (the 
thesis that science is the ultimate arbiter of truth) and (ii) confirma-
tional holism (the thesis that scientific theories face the tribunal of 
experience as a whole). 
The indispensability argument is considered the strongest natural-
istic argument for mathematical realism (see e.g. Field 1980: 5). If 
sound, it allows us to draw ontological conclusions from the success-
ful application of mathematics in the empirical sciences to the confir-
mation of the existence of mathematical entities. Indeed mathematical 
entities, on Quine’s view, are on a par with theoretical entities in 
scientific theories: since there is no non-arbitrary way of discerning 
the support conferred by empirical evidence to theoretical entities 
referred to in scientific theories, and mathematical and theoretical 
entities are equally indispensable to scientific theories, it follows that 
mathematical entities are empirically confirmed in the same way as 
theoretical entities are (see Quine 1969: 97-98 and 1981:149-151). 
Analogously, on this view, mathematics and science are also epis-
temologically on a par: when a scientific theory is confirmed, the 
mathematics which is required in the formulation of the theory also 
gets confirmed. More precisely, the soundness of each methodology 
employed in scientific practice is empirically tested along with the 
existence of the theoretical entities referred to in those theories. 
Scientific method as a whole determines what further methodologies 
are accepted as legitimate in our pursuit of knowledge of the world 
and what justificatory standards are authoritative in adjudicating 
among competing theories. Since mathematical methods are indispen-
sable to scientific practice, the Quinean naturalist takes them to be 
legitimate tools in our pursuit of knowledge.  
Maddy is a Quinean scientific naturalist insofar as she thinks that 
existence questions are ultimately settled by science and that scientific 
method is the most fundamental justification for determining what 
exists. However, she notices that in mathematical and scientific 
practice the questions about the existence of mathematical entities are 
not meant to be questions about the physical existence of those enti-
ties. Scientists are neither concerned about identifying the sort of 
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empirical evidence that would confirm the existence of mathematical 
entities (such as e.g. real numbers), nor are they concerned about the 
lack of confirmation of their existence (2007: 317). Conversely, it 
could be argued that mathematicians are not driven by scientific 
method in adjudicating questions about mathematical existence. 
Considerations about what mathematical objects there are, and such 
objects’ properties, are typically settled by mathematical methods. 
On the basis of these considerations, questions about ontological 
commitment and proper method can be tackled separately.1 Maddy 
recommends neutrality with respect to mathematical ontology, and 
focuses on methodological questions such as what makes for an ac-
ceptable axiom, a dependable method of proof, and so on.2 Accord-
ingly in this paper I shall follow Maddy’s concern for methodological 
issues. 
Given this focus on methodological issues, I reformulate the indis-
pensability argument as follows: 
 
1’a. We ought to commit to the truth of all and only those theo-
retical hypotheses that are confirmed according to our best 
scientific theories’ standards of confirmation (Quinean scien-
tific naturalism) 
 
1’b. Scientific statements are not confirmed individually, but only 
as a corporate body (confirmational holism) 
 
2’. Mathematics is indispensable to our best scientific theories 
 
Therefore, 
 
3’. We ought to commit to the truth of mathematical statements. 
Our best scientific theories jointly constitute our best overall the-
ory of the world. The Quinean scientific naturalist commits to the 
thesis that we are justified in believing an overall theory of the world 
 
1 In particular, the epistemological question of what justificatory standards are 
authoritative in mathematics becomes primary once we deny confirmational holism; 
more on this will be said in the next section. 
2 Questions about justificatory standards are both epistemological and methodo-
logical questions, so I shall use the terms interchangeably when talking about issues 
concerning justification of mathematical statements. 
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to the extent that it is sanctioned by our current scientific standards, 
and earns the conclusion that we are justified in believing indispensa-
ble mathematics to be true. The mathematical naturalist holds that 
mathematics is to be accepted insofar as it is part of our best overall 
theory of the world, but denies premise 1’b of the argument. If 
confirmation does not holistically extend among different compo-
nents of scientific theories, 1’a does not entail that mathematical 
statements are to be believed literally true of the world. So the 
mathematical naturalist is committed to believe all empirically con-
firmed scientific statements to be true, but does not have to commit 
to the claim that only empirically confirmed statements are to be 
accepted.3 Thus the mathematical naturalist endorses a weaker ver-
sion of scientific realism, according to which we ought to accept (as 
opposed to believe to be true) all (as opposed to all and only) those 
theoretical hypotheses that are confirmed according to our best 
scientific theories’ standards of confirmation. 
To support the view that a good (or the best, as the naturalist 
would rather say) overall theory of the world is one which is at least 
compatible with our scientific standards, with the view that scientific 
theories are to be believed on the basis of their being part of our best 
overall theory of the world is obviously circular. However, there is 
shared agreement on the thesis that naturalism is not a philosophical 
doctrine which can be established by means of compelling arguments, 
but rather a meta-philosophical attitude which can only be recom-
mended. In this sense, this kind of circularity does not represent a 
dangerous worry for the scientific and mathematical naturalist alike 
insofar as it is already implicit in the naturalistic core tenet commend-
ing philosophical modesty (see Maddy 2007: 235). 
Indispensability and Revisionism 
Maddy wants to block the problematic consequence of the indispen-
sability argument that only the part of mathematics which is applied in 
natural science has a legitimate epistemological status. She does that 
by rejecting confirmational holism (premise 1’b) on the basis of a 
 
3 See § 2 for an account of why the denial of confirmational holism allows the 
mathematical naturalist to hold different epistemic attitudes towards different 
components of scientific theories. 
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historical analysis of scientific practice. According to Maddy, such 
analysis shows that scientific theories are not regarded as a homoge-
neous whole up for confirmation as a unit, but that 
The mere presence, even indispensable presence, of a posit in our the-
ory of the world is not enough to warrant the conclusion that its exis-
tence has been established. … [T]he mathematical posits appear in de-
scriptions that we don’t regard as true, from which it would be inappro-
priate to draw ontological morals of any kind (2007: 315-316).4 
For the sake of the argument, I shall assume that confirmational 
holism can be successfully denied.  
The indispensability argument crucially relies on confirmational 
holism for the inference from the empirical confirmation gained by 
successful scientific theories to the confirmation of the bits of mathe-
matics which are indispensable to formulate those theories. If confir-
mation does not holistically extend among different theoretical com-
ponents of any scientific theories, it also does not extend from any 
scientific theory to a mathematical theory indispensable to its formu-
lation. Therefore, if confirmational holism is denied, we are not 
entitled to draw ontological and epistemological conclusions about 
mathematics on the grounds of successful application of (part of) 
mathematics to natural science. Furthermore, we are allowed to have 
different epistemic attitudes towards different components of our 
theory of the world and, in particular, about the empirical and 
mathematical components of a theory. Hence, the revisionary stance 
on mathematical practice can be avoided.  
Maddy’s rejection of the indispensability argument for mathemat-
ics parallels her rejection of confirmational holism for science. In both 
cases the grounds for rejection are the misrepresentation of the actual 
practice of science and mathematics offered in the corresponding 
argument, where an accurate account of scientific and mathematical 
practice are the primary concern of the naturalist. In particular, she 
argues that scientific practice, contra confirmational holism, shows 
that scientists help themselves to whatever mathematics best suits 
their purposes. They are not concerned about the ontological status of 
 
4 The historical case study that Maddy analyses is the gradual acceptance of the 
existence of atoms; for an extensive discussion of Quinean holism see Maddy (2007; 
I.6; IV.2.i). 
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the theoretical entities involved, and simply regard mathematical 
statements either as useful tools or even as literally false idealisations 
(ibid.). In the same way, contra the indispensability argument, mathe-
maticians do not see their activity as constrained or even guided by 
the necessity of application (2007: 345). The grounds for believing 
theorems are deduction from axioms, appeal to mathematical intui-
tion, or other intra-mathematical considerations. Such intra-
mathematical considerations drive mathematicians’ pursuit of novel, 
pure mathematical theories.5 So just as Maddy’s criticism to confir-
mational holism points at an implicit tension between the holistic 
principle – that scientific theories are up for confirmation as a whole 
– and actual scientific practice, her criticism to the indispensability 
argument points at an implicit tension between the claim that only 
applied mathematics matters and actual mathematical practice. That 
is, the indispensability argument portrays mathematical practice in a 
misleading way by claiming that only empirically confirmed parts of 
mathematics are granted a legitimate epistemological status. Thus, 
ultimately, the indispensability argument should be rejected on 
naturalistic grounds. 
A truly naturalistic attitude towards mathematical practice, on 
Maddy’s view, also recommends the naturalist philosopher not to be 
revisionary about mathematical practice itself. If the commitment to 
indispensable mathematics had been the prevailing guiding principle 
of scientific and mathematical practice, many mathematical theories – 
initially pursued for purely mathematical reasons, but later shown to 
be of fundamental importance for natural science – would not have 
been developed (see e.g. the case of group theory for quantum me-
chanics, 2007: 347). A careful historical analysis of the practices 
involved shows that mathematics can best serve the needs of science 
when left flourishing without any extra-mathematical constraints. 
Therefore the mathematical naturalist is not entitled to reject some 
parts of accepted mathematical practice, which do not feature in 
scientific explanations, sanctioning only those parts of mathematics 
that receive empirical confirmation in virtue of their indispensability 
to successful scientific theories. 
 
5 By pure mathematics Maddy means ‘mathematics pursued for its own reasons, 
using its own methods, quite independent of [the naturalist’s] well-honed arsenal of 
observation, experiment, theory formation and so on’, and ‘away from the neces-
sity of application’ (2007: 345). 
Naturalising Mathematics 331 
A question may arise as to what extent confirmational holism is in 
fact revisionary about mathematical practice. In his reply to Parsons, 
Quine (1986: 400) suggests that the scientific naturalist is not com-
pelled to regard only strictly indispensable mathematics as confirmed, 
but can consider as confirmed whatever mathematics is required for 
‘rounding out’ indispensable mathematics. On this account, e.g., 
much of set theory would turn out to be included in confirmed 
mathematics in virtue of the fact that it underwrites most contempo-
rary mathematics (see also Colyvan 2007), and only higher reaches of 
set theory would be considered as purely recreational. Ultimately, a 
very small fragment of mathematics is so isolated from the rest that it 
does not appear at any point of a chain of applications which bottoms 
out with applications in empirical science. So the price to pay in 
terms of methodological autonomy of mathematics for endorsing 
confirmational holism is after all not high. If confirmational holism is 
not revisionary in a substantive sense, the mathematical naturalist may 
not be able to reject the indispensability argument on naturalistic 
grounds.  
However, Maddy’s mathematical naturalism is not affected by this 
move. Even if indispensable mathematics is extended to include most 
of pure mathematics, Maddy’s concern is precisely to argue that 
mathematics as a whole has a legitimate epistemological status. This 
includes absolutely unapplied mathematics, such as the higher reaches 
of set theory, one of Maddy’s primary concerns in both her 1997 and 
2007. So regardless of how revisionary the indispensability argument 
is, the mathematical naturalist would reject it on the grounds that 
mathematical practice is not conducted as if the indispensability 
argument was true. 
Such considerations motivate Maddy to depart from Quinean sci-
entific naturalism and reformulate the naturalist’s meta-philosophical 
attitude towards mathematics. As an extremely successful enterprise, 
mathematics should be understood as it is practiced. Again, a good 
starting point would be looking at the history of mathematics. This 
reveals that until the eighteenth century mathematics was entrenched 
with science and philosophy. From the nineteenth century mathemat-
ics started differentiating its standards and goals from those of the 
other practices, freed itself from the purposes of serving science, and 
claimed its autonomy in pursuing purely mathematical problems by 
means of purely mathematical methods. Thus, according to Maddy, 
the naturalistic philosopher should, on naturalistic grounds, grant to 
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mathematics the same respect that Quinean scientific naturalism 
grants to science. Mathematics should be understood and evaluated 
on its own terms and according to its own standards. The methodo-
logical autonomy of mathematics is the core of Maddy’s mathematical 
naturalism: 
Mathematics should be understood and evaluated in its own terms, and 
should not be subject to criticism from, and does not stand in need of 
support from, some external, supposedly higher point of view (be it sci-
entific or philosophical).6 
Astrological and Theological Naturalism 
While maintaining Quinean scientific naturalism with respect to 
science, the naturalistic philosopher à la Maddy has three important 
advantages over the naturalistic philosopher à la Quine. Firstly, in 
virtue of her rejection of confirmational holism she can consistently 
avoid adopting a revisionary stance towards the methodology of 
currently accepted mathematical practice. Secondly, for the same 
reason, she can also be a scientific naturalist without being committed 
to the literal truth of every statement that features our best overall 
theory of the world. Thirdly, she can account for the special status of 
mathematical methodology with respect to scientific methodological 
standards.  
It is not clear, however, that the methodological autonomy of 
mathematics comes at a lesser price than its curtailment in the light of 
experimental evidence. Mathematical naturalism seems to yield the 
problematic consequence that if mathematical justificatory standards 
are independent from scientific standards of confirmation, mathemat-
ics is on a par with lots of other intellectual enterprises whose results 
we would count as pseudo-science. For example, it may be argued 
 
6 The thesis as presented here is to be found in Maddy (1997:184). In 2007, 
Maddy modifies and reformulates many aspects of her 1997 view (including a 
substantial shift in terminology, from mathematical naturalism to second philosophy of 
mathematics) but maintains the core tenets. For ease of exposition, I shall here stick 
to the original terminology but shall refer to her recent work (Maddy 2007) unless 
otherwise stated. 
The plausibility of mathematical naturalism arguably relies on the methodological 
unity of mathematics, which is itself a highly problematic issue. However, for 
reasons of space, I shall not consider this point here. 
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that astrology is such an enterprise: it has its own methodological 
standards and ontological commitments which are assessed and justi-
fied, as in the case of mathematics, on the basis of its own standards.  
Maddy’s reply to this objection is in line with Quinean scientific 
naturalism. For astrology makes causal claims about spatio-temporal 
reality, the naturalistic philosopher would simply treat astrological 
claims as scientific claims and test them against scientific method, 
eventually showing that they are not adequately supported by empiri-
cal evidence (1997: 203-5, 2007: 107-9). However, even though 
scientific testing undermines astrological empirical predictions it tells 
us nothing about the status of mathematics. The mathematical natu-
ralist, unlike the Quinean naturalist, would not consider mathemati-
cal statements as saying anything about the spatio-temporal realm 
because of the way the practitioners themselves regard mathematical 
statements in their ordinary practice, and she would not consider any 
mathematical statements as up for confirmation by scientific testing. 
Maddy acknowledges that the same worry may be reformulated at 
a more abstract level to include the case of not empirically testable 
disciplines. For example, we may think of a discipline, pure theology, 
not making any causal claims but describing the interactions of God 
and angels in an abstract realm (2007: 346). As pure mathematics, 
this discipline would not straightforwardly be a part of science, 
though it would be in principle liable to figure in scientific explana-
tions. This discipline would be in all relevant respects analogous to 
pure mathematics, including its methodological autonomy and unre-
visability in the light of scientific standards.7 In this case the mathe-
matical naturalist has apparently no grounds for rejecting theological 
naturalism as unscientific. 
Dieterle (1999) argued that the mathematical naturalist cannot 
meet this objection because the argument in support of mathematical 
 
7 The idea that mathematics is not counterfactually bound to states of affairs in 
the world is implicit throughout all of Maddy’s discourse. Though in the context of 
mathematical naturalism the unrevisability of mathematics cannot be explained by 
appealing to the centrality of mathematics in the web of beliefs as in Quinean 
scientific naturalism, Maddy never explicitly defends this claim nor considers why 
even applied mathematics would be unrevisable on scientific grounds (see also 
Tennant 2000). For reasons of space, I shall not address this issue here. For a 
discussion of the debate over the question whether Quinean scientific naturalism 
holds mathematics to be on a par with other parts of scientific theories in terms of 
confirmation but not in terms of falsification, see Busch forthcoming. 
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naturalism ultimately rests on indispensability considerations, and 
without the appeal to indispensability the Quinean naturalist cannot 
reject astrological or theological naturalism as unscientific.  
More specifically, Dieterle argues that if mathematics was just a 
tool for scientists (as Maddy seems to suggest), then unapplied 
mathematics and theology are on a par and do not figure in scientific 
explanations, and the Quinean scientific naturalist only has to accept 
those parts of mathematics that are applied. This view, however, just 
is Quinean scientific naturalism. If, on the other hand, mathematics is 
more than a mere tool, then the fact that mathematical statements 
figure in scientific explanations means that mathematical statements 
say something about the spatio-temporal realm. If it was so, then 
applied mathematics would be on a par with astrology and pure 
mathematics would be on a par with pure theology. The reason for 
the first analogy is that both applied mathematics and astrology would 
make causal claims about the spatio-temporal realm, but would be 
equally unrevisable in the light of scientific standards. In the second 
case, mathematical and theological statements would be equally a-
causal but liable to figure in scientific explanations. Therefore  
‘Maddy's use of indispensability considerations in the defence of mathe-
matical naturalism ultimately either (1) undermines mathematical natu-
ralism itself, leaving us with only scientific naturalism, or (2) leaves 
open the possibility of other unpalatable naturalisms’ (1999: 131). 
Despite representing an important threat to mathematical naturalism, 
this objection is not conclusive. Indeed, it takes Quinean scientific 
naturalism as the background view in line with Maddy, but implicitly 
relies on confirmational holism – a thesis that, as seen before, the 
mathematical naturalist can consistently deny. This allows the 
mathematical naturalist to further deny that indispensably figuring in 
scientific explanations entails empirical confirmation. Thus, the 
mathematical naturalist is entitled to grant mathematics methodologi-
cal autonomy and a legitimate epistemological status without commit-
ting her to the ontological and epistemological consequences of the 
indispensability argument. 
In the next section I shall analyse the mathematical naturalist's 
grounds for a response to Dieterle’s objection. I shall then articulate a 
further worry also originating from the appeal to indispensability 
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considerations and, in the final section, I shall outline and assess a 
possible argument in support of mathematical naturalism. 
Maddy’s reply 
Maddy denies that applied mathematics has a different epistemological 
status from pure mathematics just in virtue of the former’s successful 
application to science. However, this does not amount to having 
established that mathematics as a whole has a legitimate epistemologi-
cal status independently of scientific standards. According to Maddy, 
it is possible to ground the legitimate epistemological status of 
mathematics as a whole in the role that mathematics plays in our 
overall theory of the world and in its importance in our pursuit of 
truth.  
To support this point, Maddy considers the following thought ex-
periment. Though providing tools for natural science is not the pri-
mary aim of pure mathematics, it is still one of its main aims. If 
mathematicians decided to pursue utterly different goals, Maddy 
contends, then mathematics would become irrelevant to science, and 
science would have to replace it with a different tool, say mathemat-
ics*. So if old mathematics was like pure theology its role would also 
be similar, and the new tool, mathematics*, would play the role that 
mathematics played before in the naturalistic philosopher’s investiga-
tion (2007: 150-151; 2007: 350). If, conversely, parts of pure theol-
ogy were discovered to be applicable, then pure theology would be 
functioning as the old pure mathematics, and it would have the same 
role the mathematical naturalist grants to actual pure mathematics.  
The thought experiment purports to suggest that what confers a 
legitimate epistemological status to mathematics is not its methodo-
logical autonomy, but its indispensability as a tool in the pursuit of 
our understanding of the world. Thus the objection that the mathe-
matical naturalist is compelled to deny either the usefulness of 
mathematics or its methodological autonomy can be resisted by 
appealing to the place that mathematics occupies in our overall theory 
of the world. 
More generally, on this view, what distinguishes mathematics 
from science is its methodological solipsism; pure mathematics devel-
ops by pursuing purely mathematical goals, and is not subject to 
revisability in the light of scientific standards of confirmation. On the 
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other hand, what distinguishes mathematics from other forms of non-
scientific enquiry is not its methodological solipsism, but the indis-
pensable role that it plays in our overall theory of the world. How-
ever, is the indispensability of mathematics a consideration that the 
mathematical naturalist can legitimately appeal to in order to discern 
mathematics from pseudo-science? 
Again, Maddy does not explicitly argue in support of this move, 
but an argument on behalf of the mathematical naturalist could be 
outlined in the following way. Quinean scientific naturalism holds 
that we are justified in accepting an overall theory of the world to the 
extent that it is confirmed by empirical evidence. Accordingly, we 
ought to accept any theory which is part of our best overall theory of 
the world, whereby such a theory is recognised as scientific. As 
mathematics is indispensable to scientific theories, it is also indispen-
sable to our best overall theory of the world (the indispensability 
relation being transitive). Hence, we ought to accept mathematics.  
This argument seems to run into an obvious objection, again tar-
geted at the appeal to indispensability considerations. Because of her 
rejection of the indispensability argument, the mathematical naturalist 
cannot appeal to the application of mathematics in natural science in 
order to ground the acceptance of mathematics (call this the applica-
bility objection).8 Maddy is aware of this objection:  
[The appeal to the usefulness of mathematics to natural science] is not a 
reversion to a Quinean indispensability argument, because the conclu-
sion is only that mathematics is different from pure astrology, not that 
mathematics is confirmed (2007: 346, footnote 4). 
In other words, what is being denied by the mathematical naturalist is 
not the claim that mathematics is indispensable to scientific practice, 
but the inference from the indispensable role that applied mathemat-
ics plays in scientific explanations to the confirmation of the existence 
of mathematical entities and the legitimacy of applied mathematical 
methods. The mathematical naturalist can recognise the autonomy of 
mathematics with respect to scientific practice while not denying its 
crucial role within our best overall theory of the world. This crucial 
role in fact makes mathematics as a whole different from pseudo-
 
8 Maddy uses the terms indispensability and usefulness of mathematics with re-
spects to scientific practice interchangeably, so I shall here conform to her use. 
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science, and not – as the indispensability argument purports to estab-
lish – the indirect empirical confirmation received by some mathe-
matical statements through their successful application in scientific 
practice. 
How Indispensable is the Indispensability Argument? 
Despite the appeal of this proposal, I shall argue that the strategy 
outlined above is unavailable to the mathematical naturalist. If the 
argument is correct, then mathematical naturalism cannot meet the 
applicability objection and thus ultimately fails to explain the differ-
ence between mathematics and pseudo-science.  
It is important to notice that the criterion for discerning the suc-
cess of any practice is ultimately scientific, for both the scientific and 
the mathematical naturalist. The success of a practice is determined 
by the role it plays in our best overall theory of the world. Since (in 
line with Quinean scientific naturalism) our best overall theory of the 
world is adjudicated by our current scientific standards, it trivially 
follows that any practice that plays a crucial role in our current best 
overall theory of the world is ultimately accepted on the grounds of 
the very same standards. As seen before, astrology is dismissed as 
pseudo-science by empirically testing its causal claims, and pure 
theology by observing that it does not play any role in our best overall 
theory of the world.  
Only one part of mathematics, however, is involved in scientific 
explanations and empirical predictions. So there is an asymmetry in 
the standards of acceptance for pure and applied mathematics: applied 
mathematical methodology is both accepted on scientific grounds and 
sanctioned by mathematical standards, whereas pure mathematical 
methodology is just sanctioned by mathematical standards. Mathe-
matical naturalism does not warrant the acceptance of pure mathe-
matics by scientific standards.9 In order to conclude that mathematics 
 
9 It follows from this that the mathematical naturalist cannot even claim that 
mathematics is a successful enterprise as a whole simply on the basis of historical 
study and careful observation of mathematical practice. The criterion for a practice 
to be successful is still a scientific one, and pure mathematics cannot be judged 
successful on scientific grounds in the absence of a positive argument in support of 
this claim. So the mathematical naturalist can only claim that mathematics is a 
successful enterprise as a whole conditionally upon the soundness of Maddy’s reply 
to the applicability objection.  
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as a whole ought to be accepted, the mathematical naturalist must be 
able to warrant the inference from the usefulness of a part of mathe-
matics to the acceptance of mathematics as a whole. Therefore, some 
sort of holistic extension of acceptance is needed in order to establish 
the conclusion that pure mathematical standards ought to be accepted 
on the basis of scientific standards (i.e., that mathematics as a whole is 
accepted on scientific grounds) because of the successful application 
that part of mathematics receives in scientific practice. 
At this point the mathematical naturalist may decide to bite the 
bullet and support this strategy, still without committing to confirma-
tional holism. She has in fact strong reasons not to accept the onto-
logical consequences of the indispensability argument – the conse-
quences violate the naturalistic maxim not to be revisionary about a 
successful practice. She has, however, no principled reasons against a 
weaker version of holism which only focuses on the grounds for 
acceptability of scientific methodologies, and which respects the 
tenets of mathematical naturalism with respect to ontological mat-
ters. The idea of a methodological holism may be formulated as follows: 
the soundness of the methodological maxims employed in our pursuit 
of knowledge of the external world is not tested individually, but 
methodologies as a whole receive epistemological legitimacy through 
successful application in scientific practice. Given the central tenet of 
mathematical naturalism, according to which mathematical method-
ology should not be subject to extra-mathematical criticism, if the 
mathematical naturalist assumes methodological holism, then for pure 
mathematics to be part of our best overall theory of the world just is 
for it to be sanctioned by its own methods and standards. On the 
assumptions that, firstly, a theory is recognised as scientific if it is part 
of our best overall theory of the world, and that, secondly, mathe-
matics is indispensable to our best overall theory of the world, we can 
grant mathematics as a whole the status of a scientific theory even 
though it is sanctioned by its own methods and standards. 
By appealing to methodological holism the mathematical naturalist 
can draw the desired epistemological conclusion that mathematical 
methodology ought to be accepted as a whole. This follows from the 
vindication of the methodology of applied mathematics through the 
indispensable role of applied mathematics in science. She can thus 
maintain that the credibility of mathematics rests on a scientific basis 
even though mathematics is not subject to scientific criticism. This 
provides the mathematical naturalist with the desired criterion to 
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distinguish pure mathematical methodology from pseudo-scientific 
methodologies on the basis of the indispensable role that mathematics 
as a whole plays in our best overall theory of the world. Furthermore, 
not only does methodological holism respect the ontological neutral-
ity of the mathematical naturalist, but it also justifies the acceptance 
of mathematics regardless of any stance a naturalist may have with 
respect to mathematical ontology. Methodological holism allows the 
naturalist to remain faithful to Quinean scientific naturalism for what 
concerns ultimate matters of existence of mathematical entities, but 
at the same time allows her to vindicate the methodological autonomy 
of mathematics and its special epistemological status among sciences.  
However, is methodological holism a viable option for the 
mathematical naturalist? Since the naturalistic standards for accep-
tance are scientific, the extension of the acceptability from applied 
mathematical methodology to pure mathematical methodology is only 
warranted on the grounds of a possible future application of pure 
mathematical methods in scientific practice. As such, adopting meth-
odological holism seems to be in tension with the mathematical 
naturalistic prescription not to take applied mathematical methodol-
ogy as a guide to mathematical methodology as a whole. Yet, granting 
epistemic value to pure mathematics regardless of any possible appli-
cation is precisely the motivation behind mathematical naturalism. As 
briefly seen above, Maddy argues that the history of mathematics 
shows how from the nineteenth century mathematics started differen-
tiating its standards and goals from those of other scientific practices, 
and providing useful tools for scientific practice ceased to be the main 
concern of mathematicians. If it had not been so, many mathematical 
theories initially pursued out of purely mathematical interest and 
devoid of any application would not have been developed. Hence, 
endorsing methodological holism would result in the failure to appre-
ciate the methodological autonomy of mathematics, and in the adop-
tion of a revisionary stance towards pure mathematical practice, 
which the mathematical naturalist forcefully rejects. 
In summary, the claim that mathematics as a whole is acceptable 
on scientific grounds only follows if methodological holism is as-
sumed, but methodological holism cannot be assumed because it is 
incompatible with the mathematical naturalistic prescription not to be 
revisionary about mathematical practice. Therefore the mathematical 
naturalist faces a dilemma: either she accepts methodological holism 
at the price of a revisionary stance on mathematical practice, or she 
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rejects methodological holism at the price of losing a criterion to 
distinguish pure mathematics from pseudo-science. 
More specifically, we have seen that the assumption of methodo-
logical holism allows the mathematical naturalist to (i) justify pure 
mathematical methodology on scientific grounds, and (ii) to distin-
guish pure mathematics from pseudo-science. However, methodo-
logical holism commits the mathematical naturalist to making scien-
tific standards authoritative in the assessment of mathematical meth-
odology, in line with Quinean scientific naturalism. This ultimately 
forces the mathematical naturalist to deny her maxim that mathemat-
ics should not be subject to extra-mathematical standards, and to 
deny the scientific status of pure mathematics, resulting in the adop-
tion of a revisionary stance on mathematical practice. Thus if the 
mathematical naturalist accepts methodological holism, her position 
will be indistinguishable from Quinean scientific naturalism. 
On the other hand, if the mathematical naturalist does not give up 
on the methodological solipsism of mathematics but rejects methodo-
logical holism, she cannot appeal to the indispensable role that 
mathematics plays in our overall theory of the world to justify the 
scientific status of pure mathematics. Without an holistic extension of 
acceptance from applied to pure mathematical methodology, pure 
mathematics is only sanctioned by mathematical standards. This 
makes mathematics completely devoid of application not indispensa-
ble to science, and accordingly not a discipline whose methodology is 
to be included among the methodologies of the scientific theories 
which constitute our best overall theory of the world. Thus if the 
mathematical naturalist rejects methodological holism, she is left with 
no criterion to discern pure mathematical methodology from pseudo-
scientific ones. Therefore, she has to conclude that pure mathematics 
and pure theology are methodologically on a par, and she has to grant 
theological naturalism the same respect that she grants mathematical 
naturalism. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have considered one of the most influential contempo-
rary views on the naturalisation of mathematics and I have argued that 
despite its advantages, it ultimately falls short of accounting for the 
special status of mathematical practice within the framework of 
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Quinean scientific naturalism. I considered an important objection to 
mathematical naturalism which focuses on the appeal to the usefulness 
of mathematics and showed that the mathematical naturalist can resist 
it because of her rejection of confirmational holism. I then reformu-
lated the worry by taking into account Maddy’s (2007) reply, and 
argued that her rejection of confirmational holism does not allow the 
mathematical naturalist to make the inference from the acceptability 
of the methodology of applied mathematics to the acceptability of the 
methodology implicit in mathematical practice as a whole. Therefore 
mathematical naturalism fails to accommodate the methodological 
autonomy of mathematics within Quinean scientific naturalism. 
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Abstract 
Indispensability arguments (IA) for mathematical realism are commonly 
traced back to Quine. We identify two different Quinean strands in the 
interpretation of IA, what we label the ‘logical point of view’ and the 
‘theory-contribution’ point of view. Focusing on each of the latter, we 
offer two minimal versions of IA. These both dispense with a number of 
theoretical assumptions commonly thought to be relevant to IA (most 
notably confirmational holism and naturalism). We then show that the 
attribution of both minimal arguments to Quine is controversial, and 
stress the extent to which this is so in both cases, in order to attain a bet-
ter appreciation of the Quinean heritage of IA. 
 
Keywords 
Quine's philosophy of mathematics, indispensability arguments, Platon-
ism, naturalism, inference to the best explanation. 
Introduction and aims* 
Word and Object (Quine 1960) contains an illuminating footnote 
concerning its author’s views on mathematical platonism. While 
stressing the advantages of his ‘canonical notation of quantification’, 
and ‘the restoration of law and order’ that it allows in ontological 
 
* The authors would like to thank the audience at the Word and Object, 50 Years 
Later conference (Rome, 28-29 May 2010) for fruitful discussion, and the audience 
at the Trends in the Philosophy of Mathematics conference (Frankfurt, 1-4 September 
2009) for discussion on an earlier draft. Many thanks also to Mario De Caro, 
Patrick Greenough, Marco Panza, and two anonymous referees. 
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disputes (Quine 1960: 242), Quine feels the need for the following 
clarification: 
A more accountable misapprehension is that I am a nominalist. I must 
correct it; [...] In all books and most papers I have appealed to classes 
and recognized them as abstract objects. I have indeed inveighed against 
making and imputing platonistic assumptions gratuitously, but equally 
against obscuring them. Where I have speculated on what can be got 
from a nominalistic basis, I have stressed the difficulties and limitations. 
(ibidem: 243, fn. 5) 
Clearly this had not always been the case, as the complete renuncia-
tion of abstract entities declared in the first lines of Quine’s and 
Goodman’s ‘Steps Towards a Constructive Nominalism’ makes 
clear.1 But that declaration, as Quine himself stresses, ‘needs demo-
tion to the status of a mere statement of conditions for the construc-
tion in hand’ (ibidem). Furthermore, Mancosu 2008 has recently 
shown that Quine’s doubts on the feasibility of that construction and 
the consequent complete renunciation of (mathematical) abstract 
entities emerged as early as in 1948. 
It is now clear that Quine’s stance with respect to the problem of 
the existence of mathematical objects is far from being a nominalist 
one, despite Quine’s empiricist and naturalist framework. The rea-
sons offered by Quine for this have been regimented in the form of an 
argument, today widely renowned as the Indispensability Argument 
(IA). In a nutshell, the argument appeals to the uncontroversial fact 
that mathematical theories are commonly and usefully applied in most 
of our scientific theories. Then, from the assumptions that we are 
justified in taking those scientific theories to be true, and that if they 
are true then so are the mathematical theories that we cannot avoid 
using in formulating them, we are led to conclude that these indispen-
sable mathematical theories are true and that their mathematical 
objects exist. 
Quine suggested the basic ideas underlying IA, but he offered no 
definite formulation of it. And from Putnam’s Philosophy of Logic 
(1971) onwards, it is rare to find two formulations that completely 
 
1 Cf. Goodman, Quine (1947: 105): ‘We do not believe in abstract entities. No 
one supposes that abstract entities—classes, relations, properties, etc.—exist in 
space-time; but we mean more than this. We renounce them altogether’. 
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square with each other. Nevertheless, from both Word and Object and a 
vast number of Quine’s essays, it is possible to single out partly 
overlapping clusters of theses and notions that, in different forms, 
constitute the Quinean heritage of the various versions of IA available 
on the market.  
At least two different strands in the post-Quinean discussion of IA 
are, according to us, identifiable. On the one hand, there is the 
traditional analytic attention to theories’ formulation and expressive 
power, focusing on logico-syntactical considerations regarding the 
form of scientific and mathematical theories, the notion of reference 
to mathematical objects, and the adjudication of a proper criterion of 
ontological commitment. Call this the logical point of view. On the 
other hand, we find considerations stemming from the philosophy of 
science regarding how scientific theories work and how they are 
confirmed, what forms of argument are appropriate for justifying 
belief in those theories, and how different posited entities contribute 
to the overall epistemic and semantic evaluation of a given theory. 
Call this the theoretical contribution point of view. Most of the notions 
and theses to which many formulations of IA are currently thought to 
appeal – ontological commitment, indispensability, naturalism, and 
confirmational holism – merge aspects of both these two strands. 
It is our contention that most of the available formulations of IA 
can be thought of as organized in a spectrum. At both ends of the 
spectrum lie minimal versions of the argument; minimal, that is, 
insofar as they feature the fewest or least controversial conceptual 
ingredients that are required in order to derive the desired conclu-
sion. The arguments at each extreme are representative, respectively, 
of the two points of view just described. Various central shades of the 
spectrum are given by different versions of IA, obtained through the 
addition or subtraction of one or more assumptions. 
It is not our present aim to review the overall structure of this 
spectrum. Rather, we want to show that there are both theoretical 
and exegetical problems in tracing both minimal versions of IA back 
to Quine’s positions, and that these problems raise a number of 
concerns both regarding Quine’s own way of reflecting on the issue 
and regarding the structure of the current debate. 
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From a logical point of view2 
Colyvan’s version of IA (Colyvan 2001) is a suitable representative of 
the sort of arguments that we would locate between the two ex-
tremes of our suggested spectrum: 
[CIA] Colyvan’s Indispensability Argument  
 
i) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only 
those entities that are indispensable to our best scientific 
theories; 
ii) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific 
theories; 
[CIA] ------------------------------ 
iii) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical 
entities. 
According to Colyvan, the first biconditional premise ‘follows from 
the doctrines of naturalism and holism’ (Colyvan 2001: 12) – as re-
gards, respectively, the ‘only’ direction and the ‘all’ direction of the 
biconditional. Let us state these two theses in a way convenient for 
our aims:3 
[NAT] Naturalism: scientific theories are the only source of genuine 
knowledge. As a consequence, with respect to ontology, we are justified 
in acknowledging the existence only of those entities that are quantified 
over in our true or well-confirmed scientific theories. 
 
[CH] Confirmational Holism: empirical evidence does not confirm scien-
tific hypotheses in isolation, but rather scientific theories as a whole. As 
a consequence, with respects to ontology, we are justified in acknowl-
edging the existence of all those entities that are quantified over in our 
true or well-confirmed scientific theories. 
 
2 Many of the issues in this section are explored in more details in Panza, Sereni, 
Fothcoming; cf. also Panza, Sereni, Unpublished. 
3 This implies radical simplifications in the formulation of these controversial 
theses. Naturalism, in particular, could be given milder readings. The version 
offered here, however, seems required in order for the ‘only’ direction of [CIA]’s 
first premise to follow from it. 
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Colyvan’s argument is meant to support mathematical platonism – 
the thesis that certain mathematical objects exist – rather than what 
we might call semantic realism – the thesis that certain statements (or 
theories) are true, without commitment to the idea that it is objects 
(or anything else in particular) that make them true. Reference to 
ontological commitment makes this point explicit, and Colyvan is 
indeed assuming Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment as the 
suitable one. Roughly speaking, and skipping some details:  
[QC] Quine’s Criterion of Ontological Commitment 
The ontological commitment of a theory is given by the objects that 
must be counted among the values of the variables of the existentially 
quantified statements that are entailed by the theory. 
[QC] applies to theories when they have been regimented in canonical 
notation and when it has been established what expressions must be 
indispensably employed in the reformulation thus obtained. Its appli-
cation therefore requires a clear characterization of the notion of 
indispensability. 
If we want to adhere to a Quinean formulation, as emerged at 
least from ‘Designation and Existence’ (1939) through ‘On What 
There Is’ (1948), and is clearly presented in Word and Object, indis-
pensability has to be interpreted, at least partly, as a logico-syntactical 
feature pertaining to the formulation of a theory. Quantification (over 
a given sort of entity) is what is deemed indispensable when we 
rewrite our theories in canonical notation, if it is not possible to 
dispense with it by means of paraphrase and contextual definitions. 
However, indispensability is a relative notion: when we want to 
rewrite a given theory in order to evaluate whether quantification 
over a given sort of entities is or isn’t indispensable, we first need to 
establish what features of the original theory our reformulation must 
preserve. In other words, which specific equivalence relation allows 
us to say that our new theory is equivalent to the original one. More-
over, the resulting theory must per se enjoy a number of features that, 
intuitively speaking, make it a good theory. Thus a proper general 
clarification of the notion of (in)dispensability, restricted to quantifi-
cation,4 should take the following form:  
 
4 Attention to quantification is due to the attempt to evaluate the Quinean char-
acter of IA. A more general version would remain neutral as to which is the proper 
logico-linguistic device by which (in)dispensability is established. 
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[IND] (In)dispensability: Quantification over entities X is dispensable 
from a scientific theory S if and only if there is a scientific theory T in 
which quantification over X is absent and such that: 
i) T is ε-equivalent to S, where ε-equivalence is an appropriate relation 
of equivalence among theories; 
ii) T is equally or more virtuous than S, given an appropriate criterion 
for the virtuosity of theories; 
If S quantifies over X, and there is no scientific theory T satisfying condi-
tions (i)-(ii) above, then quantification over X is indispensable for S.5 
Not only does this characterization show in what sense 
(in)dispensability is a relative, aim-specific notion (nothing is indis-
pensable per se, but only relative to a specific theoretical purpose), but 
it also allows us to specify (and, above all, forces one to declare) in 
the definition of the notion, what specific theoretical feature one 
expects scientific theories to preserve: e.g. observational content, 
empirical content, expressive power, explanatory power, and so on 
(whether each of these is exclusive with respect to all others is a 
further issue). Arguably, a good candidate for ε-equivalence for what 
we labelled the logical point of view is ‘having the same expressive 
power’: what we are interested in is whether some mathematical 
vocabulary necessarily has to be employed in order to state certain 
scientific laws. 
Let us come back to [CIA]. We now see that the latter is a version 
of IA that relies on the following four assumptions: [NAT], [CH], 
[QC] and an indispensability thesis based on [IND]. These are all 
theses or notions with Quinean origins. But do we need all this theo-
retical machinery in order to gain the desired conclusion? Many have 
stressed (Resnik 1995, Dieveny 2007, Liggins 2008) that IA can go 
through even without [CH] – as Colyvan himself suggests.6 What 
usually goes unnoticed is that IA can go through even without [NAT]. 
If we try to formulate IA in a less theoretically committed way, what 
we get is an argument of the following form: 
 
5 Selection of an appropriate criterion of virtuosity might is aim-specific, and 
might sacrifice other features of theories commonly thought to be epistemic virtues. 
It is clear, for example, that Field’s (1980) nominalized version of Newtonian 
Gravitation Theory praises ontological parsinomy and sacrifices simplicity. 
6 Cf. Colyvan (2001:37): ‘As a matter of fact, the argument can be made to 
stand without confirmational holism: it's just that it is more secure with holism’. 
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[MA] Minimal argument 
i) We are justified in believing some scientific theories to be 
true; 7 
[We are justified in believing T to be true] 
ii) Among them, some are such that some mathematical 
theories are indispensable to them; 
[M is indispensable to T] 
iii) We are justified in believing true these scientific theories 
only if we are justified in believing true the mathematical 
theories that are indispensable to them; 
[We are justified in believing T to be true only if we are 
justified in believing M to be true] 
[MAa]------------------------------ 
iv) We are justified in believing true the mathematical theo-
ries indispensable to these scientific theories. 
[We are justified in believing M true] 
v) We are justified in believing true a mathematical theory 
only if we are justified in believing the objects it is about 
to exist; 
[We are justified in believing M to be true only if we are 
justified in believing the objects it is about to exist] 
[MAb]------------------------------ 
vi) We are justified in believing the objects which the indis-
pensable mathematical theories are about to exist. 
[We are justified in believing the objects M is about to ex-
ist] 
The argument, if sound, establishes for given mathematical theo-
ries what Field (1982:501) calls theoretical indispensability. It claims 
that (we are justified in believing that) mathematical theories are true 
(or mathematical objects exist) on the grounds of considerations 
about the proper formulation or expressive power of theories. Such 
an argument – relying, among the aforementioned theses, only on 
 
7 [MA] is stated in epistemic terms. It speaks of our justification in believing cer-
tain theories to be true and certain objects to exist – as is the case in Colyvan’s 
argument and others. Notice that also a non-epistemic version of the two argu-
ments can be offered by reformulating steps (i), (iii), (iv) and (v) in such a way that 
justification is not mentioned in them. This difference hinges upon two different 
conceptions of ontology, as respectively either a descriptive or a normative disci-
pline. In the end, this leaves us with four different (minimal, though for different 
reasons) versions of IA: [MAa], [MAb], and the non-epistemic versions of both. 
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[QC] and an indispensability thesis based on [IND] – shows several 
advantages over Colyvan’s.  
One is that it shows that two different conclusions might be 
reached by different versions of IA: [MAa] is an argument for semantic 
realism, from which it is possible (but not mandatory) to get to 
platonism if one adds premise (v), which in fact can be taken to 
express (a generalizes version of) [QC].  
Secondly, notice that what is needed in order to justify premise (i) 
is some form of scientific realism, and this is a weaker position than 
[NAT]. Scientific realism sees scientific theories as a genuine source 
of knowledge, but need not consider them as the only genuine source 
of knowledge. If IA is made to appeal to both [CH] and [NAT], it 
provides sufficient and necessary conditions for its conclusion(s). Thus 
neither the semantic realist nor the platonist conclusion cannot be 
reached for all those theories (and their objects) that do not find 
application in true or well-confirmed scientific theories. Quine 
accepted this conclusion8, but a more plausible version of IA might 
want to avoid it, as does [MA]. [MA] is not by itself inconsistent, for 
example, with the belief that we can gain mathematical knowledge 
(about mathematical statements or mathematical objects) through a 
priori arguments. 
Scientific realism is something Quine clearly championed9, but it 
seems that the whole complex of Quine’s theses overdetermines a 
proper version of IA: some version will follow if both [CH] and 
[NAT] are assumed, but they need not be assumed in order for any 
version of IA to be offered. That [CH] and [NAT] are not indispensa-
ble to IA was already implicit in Putnam’s formulation in Philosophy of 
Logic (Putnam 1971:347): 
So far I have been developing an argument for realism roughly along the 
following lines: quantification over mathematical entities is indispensable 
for science, both formal and physical, therefore we should accept such 
quantification; but this commits us to accepting the existence of the 
mathematical entities in question. 
 
8 With varying attitudes: cf. Quine (1986:400) and Quine (1995:56-57). 
Maddy (1992) has argued against this consequence of a Quinean version of IA (cf. 
also Parsons 1978, Maddy 1992, Leng 2002, Colyvan 2007). 
9 Issues with indeterminacy and ontological relativity apart: cf. Putnam (1988). 
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No mention is made here of naturalism nor holism.10. If we follow 
Putnam, we can still have a proper version of IA and yet consider the 
part of the Quinean heritage consisting of [NAT] and [CH] as dispen-
sable from the argument – unless held for independent reasons and 
for these reasons alone made to bear on IA. 
The theory-contribution point of view 
Let us move to the other extreme of our suggested spectrum, and 
focus on another form of reasoning that is often appealed to in con-
nection with IA. We can take our clue from a passage of Quine’s 
often suggested to be a statement of IA: 
Ordinary interpreted scientific discourse is as irredeemably committed 
to abstract objects – to nations, species, numbers, functions, sets – as it 
is to apples and other bodies. All these things figure as values of the vari-
ables in our overall system of the world. The numbers and functions 
contribute just as genuinely to physical theory as do hypothetical parti-
cles. (Quine 1981: 149-50) 
We take Quine’s argument to be the following: if it can be argued 
that mathematical entities contribute to scientific theories in a rele-
vantly similar way to how theoretical entities contribute to those 
theories, then there is (either in the positive or in the negative sense) 
as much reason to believe that the latter exist as there is reason to 
believe that the former exist.  
Even though [CH] might have been a working hypothesis of 
Quine’s throughout his works, there is no explicit mention of it in the 
quotation above. Colyvan (2001) and Baker (2009) have accordingly 
suggested a reading of IA based on the notion of theory contribution 
that is independent of [CH] (Colyvan explicitly takes this formulation 
to be of Quinean heritage). This is obtained by stressing that IA seems 
intimately connected with arguments for scientific realism about 
theoretical entities. Theory contribution is seen in both cases as 
evidence for existence, and mathematical entities are thus argued for 
by means of an inference to the best explanation (IBE). The generic 
 
10 As concerns naturalism and the ‘only’ direction in [CIA], Putnam recently 
stressed this point again. Cf Putnam Forthcoming. 
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form of IBE can be expressed as follows (where T is a theory and X is 
a set of data): 
i) X 
ii) T, T2, …, Tn are explanations of X 
iii) T explains X better than T2…Tn 
iv) We ought rationally to believe the theory that best explains X 
[IBE]-------------------------- 
v) We ought rationally to believe T  
Scientific realists argue that if the postulation of theoretical entities 
contribute towards a given explanation being best, we have reason to 
believe that they exist. If one believes, as Quine apparently does, that 
mathematical entities contribute to the (explanatory) goodness of 
scientific theories in just the same way that theoretical entities do, 
then we ought to, by considerations of consistency, be realists about 
mathematical entities too (Colyvan 2006). We might easily state a 
version of IA that argues for mathematical platonism by means of 
[IBE] (call it IAIBE). 
It is, of course, not enough to simply postulate that mathematical 
entities contribute to scientific theories in the same way as theoretical 
entities, and much work has been done in recent literature that tries 
to argue that mathematical entities do contribute in this way (e.g 
Colyvan 2008; Baker 2005, 2009). Rather than add to that debate, 
we shall argue: (i) that IAIBE is different from other versions of IA both 
in kind and in content, and (ii) that IAIBE does not have the kind of 
Quinean heritage that Colyvan attributes to it. 
It is important to notice that [IBE] is an ampliative mode of infer-
ence. We have seen that [CIA] involves four of the ingredients intro-
duced above: [IND], [NAT], [CH] and [QC]. To what extent are any 
of these presupposed in the ampliative variety of IA? On an appropri-
ate understanding of “best theories”, only one of them is. 
Consider first [NAT]. IAIBE presupposes only scientific realism, and 
it was already pointed out that scientific realism is a weaker position 
than naturalism.  
Now consider [CH]. Appeal to theory contribution is supposed to 
make [CH] redundant: if mathematical theory M contributes appro-
priately to a scientific theory T that counts as a best explainer, we 
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thereby have a justification for M, and there is thus no need to adopt 
[CH].11 
The notion of indispensability therefore ceases to play any role. It 
is implicit that mathematics is indispensable to our current best 
theories, because any part of our current best theories (that ontologi-
cally commits to some kind of entity) is considered indispensable to 
that theory. This is partly what it means for a theory to be “best”. If 
rival empirically adequate theories existed, that had less ontological 
commitments, those theories would be considered best, everything 
else being equal. 
How about [QC]? In order to get from the truth of any theory 
whatsoever to a claim about what exists something like [QC] will be 
needed. As all that IAIBE can establish is that we have reason to believe 
that some theory is true, some variety of [QC] will be needed for 
inferring that mathematical entities (or any other entities mentioned 
in those theories) exist. So out of all of the ingredients above, only 
[QC] (or something similar) is doing any work in IAIBE.  
It is not at all clear what the Quinean heritage of IAIBE would be, 
since only one of the traditional Quinean-inspired premises will be 
doing any work in it. Colyvan clearly understands [CIA] as Quinean 
in spirit (Colyvan 2001). However, the argument from theory con-
tribution that we find in the writings of Quine is very different in 
nature from the way that scientific realists think about [IBE] and 
theory contribution as they are employed in that mode of inference. 
[IBE] is argued to be a reliable mode of inference by scientific real-
ists, in virtue of best explanations being truth tracking. As argued by 
van Fraassen (1980), one could easily interpret scientists as choosing 
some theory over others because it is more useful to employ certain 
theories over others, e.g. because certain theories are easier to work 
with in virtue of their simplicity or the like. This latter criterion is 
pragmatically motivated in that it reflects our interests and what we 
find useful: it is thus not to be related to issues of truth at all. For 
those scientific realists who argue for realism by use of [IBE] (who are 
those who would potentially be persuaded by IAIBE) it is imperative 
that a pragmatic reading of [IBE] is ruled out. Rather surprisingly, 
 
11 [CH] could be used to argue for scientific realism, but it is actually at odds 
with current varieties of scientific realism, since these hold that only parts of our 
scientific theories are confirmed by empirical evidence. See Folina (1999). 
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however, Quine understood theoretical virtues in a way that is in-
compatible with the required realist understanding of [IBE]. 
Quine’s argument for mathematical platonism by way of theory 
contribution. 
Since there is no direct evidence to support the hypothesis that theo-
retical entities exist, Quine sensibly suggests that we need to look for 
what might count as ‘indirect’ evidence for their existence. A look at 
scientific practice shows that everything else being equal, simple 
theories are judged to be better theories than complex theories:  
The molecular physicist is, like us, concerned with commonplace real-
ity, and merely finds that he can simplify his laws by positing an esoteric 
supplement to the esoteric universe (…) No matter if physics makes 
molecules or other insensible particles seem more fundamental than the 
objects of common sense, the particles are postulated for the sake of 
simple physics. (Quine 1966: 236-241) 
Quine makes two observations here. The first is that in one sense 
scientists are, like ‘us’ ordinary people, concerned with common-
place reality. The second is that scientists postulate the existence of 
entities like molecules for the sake of simplifying laws. Thus far, this 
latter claim looks rather ontologically innocent, amounting only to a 
description of how physicists practice physics, and it is ambiguous 
between a realist and an antirealist account of theoretical entities. 
When we turn to Quine’s view on how we come to form beliefs 
about objects of common-sense reality the above observations be-
come significant: 
 If we have evidence for the existence of the bodies of common sense, 
we have it only in the way in which we may be said to have evidence for 
the existence of molecules. The positing of either sort of body is good 
science insofar as it helps us formulate our laws. (Quine 1966: 237) 
All of the evidence that we consider as relevant to the existence of 
visible objects is in fact evidence in the same sense of ‘evidence’ 
relevant to the positing of molecules. Furthermore, we have here an 
indication that Quine actually thinks that positing bodies makes for 
‘simpler’ theories, in the sense that doing so is ‘helpful’. In other 
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places, he is absolutely clear that the sense of evidence he has in mind 
is best construed as pragmatically motivated:  
Actually I expect that tables and sheep are, in the last analysis, on much 
the same footing as molecules and electrons. Even these have a continu-
ing right to a place in our conceptual scheme only by virtue of their indi-
rect contribution to the overall simplicity of our linguistic or conceptual 
organization of experience; for note that even tables and sheep are not 
direct sensations… It would be senseless to speak of a motive for this 
archaic and unconscious posit [common-sense bodies], but we can sig-
nificantly speak of its function and its survival value; and in these re-
spects the hypothesis of common sense external objects is quite like that 
of molecules and electrons. (Quine 1953: 210). 
Quine has now suggested a number of things: if we have evidence for 
the existence of objects of our commonplace reality we only have 
evidence in the same sense that we have evidence for the existence of 
molecules; objects of commonplace reality are theoretic in the same 
ways as theoretical entities like molecules because they are given 
within a conceptual scheme; the reasons we have for positing the 
existence of molecules are that doing so is ‘helpful’ and ‘useful’ for 
the purpose of physics, it has a ‘function’ and a ‘survival value’. 
According to Quine there is no standard of reality outside of the 
standards given in our conceptual scheme, or theory, of the world: 
‘Everything to which we concede existence is a posit from the stand-
point of a description of the theory building process, and simultane-
ously real from the standpoint of the theory that is being built’. 
(Quine 1960: 22) 
We cannot significantly question the reality of the external world, 
or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the testimony of 
our senses; for, to do so is simply to dissociate the terms “reality” and 
“evidence” from the very applications which originally did most to 
invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they may have for us. 
(Quine 1957: 2) 
Because we take the kind of evidence that we have for making ex-
istence claims about objects – ‘their assumption helps [man] organize 
experience’ – to be defining of what we mean by evidence, we should 
by consideration of consistency also hold that this kind of evidence is 
sufficient for making claims about unobservables. Quine then argues 
that since pragmatic value is sufficient for making claims about ob-
servables, pragmatic value is also sufficient for making claims about 
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unobservables: ‘The benefits of the molecular doctrine which so 
impressed us [earlier], and the manifest benefits of the aboriginal posit 
of ordinary bodies, are the best evidence of reality we can ask’. 
(1966: 238-239) 
With this rather permissive view of evidence, we can now revisit 
the issue of whether mathematical entities and theoretical entities are 
evidentially on a par. When we look to at least some of our scientific 
theories it is no doubt true that mathematics contributes towards the 
formulation of theories that are simpler (or the like) than theories 
formulated without the use of mathematics. Thus, by Quine’s charac-
terisation of evidence, mathematics contributes to theories in a way 
that warrants belief that mathematical objects quantified over in 
mathematical theories exist:  
I think the positivists were mistaken (...). Existence statements (...) do 
admit of evidence, in the sense that we can have reasons, and essentially 
scientific reasons, for including numbers or classes or the like in the 
range of the values of our variables. Numbers and classes are favoured by 
the power and facility they contribute to theoretical physics and other 
systematic discourse about nature. (Quine 1969: 97-98) 
So quite independently of consideration about [CH], Quine pro-
duced an argument for believing that mathematical entities exist (a 
similar reconstruction of Quine can be found in Chihara 2004). 
Quine’s argument works by first pointing out the parity of evidence 
for believing that ordinary sized objects – posited in our common-
sense ‘theory’ of the world exist, and for believing that molecules – 
posited in some of our scientific theories about the world – exist. 
Then it is pointed out that the evidential grounds we have for believ-
ing that molecules exist are similar to those for believing that mathe-
matical entities exist. In each case, posits are postulated because of 
pragmatic and purpose-oriented reasons. 
Concluding remarks 
Our discussion pointed to two different directions along which the 
widespread claim that most current versions of IA are, in some way 
or other, faithful to Quine’s original ideas should be qualified. This 
result also emerges from the consideration that the most discussed 
version of IA at present, i.e. [CIA], is, despite its superficial simplicity 
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(or maybe just for that reason), ambiguous between two different 
kinds of argument, one deductive and one ampliative. 
On the one hand, as regards our discussion of what we labelled the 
‘logical point of view’ on IA, it turns out that by sticking to notions 
and theses that Quine respectively employed and endorsed, versions 
of IA can be formulated that are far less committing than most avail-
able versions. Much of the recent debate has focused on whether it is 
possible both to avoid problems posed by the alleged assumptions of 
confirmational holism and naturalism of IA, and to formulate IA 
without these assumptions. But it seems clear – as apparently seemed 
clear also to Putnam – that this formulation can be obtained, and 
those problems avoided, without being unfaithful to Quine’s thought: 
it is just a matter of disregarding those theoretical ingredients that 
overdetermine a valid version of IA. Discussion of holism and natural-
ism will thus be of relevance to IA only in so far as proponents of IA 
independently support either thesis. By themselves, they are irrele-
vant to the question of whether the sought-for realist or platonist 
conclusion can be obtained by a version of IA that is Quinean in its 
essential traits. 
On the other hand, our discussion of ‘theory contribution’ has 
made it clear that Quine's understanding of theory contribution and 
evidence, is incompatible with current scientific realist strategies for 
defending scientific realism realism by means of [IBE] as they under-
stand it. Thus one cannot base a reading of Quine, according to which 
Quine endorses [IBE] as it is understood by current scientific realists, 
in the writings of Quine himself. One might well formulate Quine’s 
argument as an argument with the same formal structure as an [IBE] 
argument, but the notion of ‘best explanation’ should then be defined 
in terms of pragmatic value. Of course, within Quine’s framework 
this is of no consequence, since one can construct an argument for 
mathematical platonism by parity considerations on the basis of what 
Quine says. But the way in which Quine understands the idea of 
theory contribution is not in line with how current realists understand 
it.  
All these issues would deserve further inquiry, and we submit that 
progress can be made in the understanding of the historical and phi-
losophical import of IA once the argument’s Quinean heritage is 
brought into sharper focus. 
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The paper considers the Quinean heritage of the argument for the inde-
terminacy of translation. Beyond analyzing Quine’s notion of stimulus 
meaning, the paper discusses two Kripkean argument’s against the 
Quinean claim that dispositions can provide the basis for an account of 
meaning: the Normativity Argument and the Finiteness Argument. An 
analogy between Kripke's arguments and Hume's argument for episte-
mological skepticism about the external world will be drawn. The paper 
shows that the answer to Kripke's rule-following skepticism is analogous 
to the answer to Humean skepticism: our use of concepts is more basic 
than, and presupposed by, the statement of the skeptical problem itself. 
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Quine's argument for indeterminacy 
Quine's argument for the indeterminacy of translation remains a 
source of fascination and controversy today, fifty years after its publi-
cation. The argument is grounded in Quine's conception of the objec-
tive facts to which translation is responsible. These, according to him, 
are strictly limited to those that make up «the overall pattern of 
associations of sentences with one another and with nonverbal stimu-
lation». (Quine 1960: 27) The significance of the limitations he 
imposes on the facts to which translation must do justice is apparent 
in his famous Gavagai example. Suppose that for our informant in the 
group whose language is to be translated "Gavagai" is prompted by all 
and only the stimulations that would prompt "There is a rabbit" in us. 
Both would be prompted, for example, by retinal stimulations caused 
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by realistic fake rabbits in plausible surroundings, neither would be 
prompted by retinal stimulations in the presence of real rabbits that 
were either completely hidden or well-camouflaged, and so forth. In 
this case, according to Quine, "Gavagai" construed as a one-word 
sentence would have the same stimulus meaning as our sentence "There 
is a rabbit." And for such highly observational sentences, Quine holds 
that stimulus meaning is a good approximation to meaning as it is 
intuitively understood. (cf. Quine 1960, 44) 
The problem, according to Quine, occurs when we try to equate 
terms (e.g. referring expressions or predicates) in the language being 
translated and our own. This is because the stimulus-meaning of 
"Gavagai" construed as a sentence would be preserved by either of two 
very different translations. According to the first translation, "gava-
gai" (construed as a word) corresponds to our word "rabbit." In this 
case, we can take our informant to mean "is the same rabbit as" when 
he assents to "gavagai" when we point at the head and when he as-
sents again to "gavagai" when we point at the tail of the same rabbit. 
According to the second translation, "gavagai" (again construed as a 
word) corresponds to our "undetached rabbit part." In this case, we 
suppose that our informant means "belongs to the same rabbit as" 
when he assents to "gavagai" when we point to the head and again 
when we point to the tail of the same rabbit. And since Quine thinks 
that such physical dispositions to respond are the only objective facts 
there are and that they are exhausted by stimulus-meaning, he holds 
that translation is indeterminate. (cf. Quine 1960, 51-79) 
Quine's examples are never worked out in detail, and there is 
some skepticism as to whether nontrivial examples of indeterminacy 
exist. I think, however, that a detailed example can be given based on 
Quine's thesis that there is no principled distinction between meaning 
and collateral information (at least where the latter is shared by the 
community). 
"Bachelor" as an Observational Term Example. Imagine an informant – Smith 
– who applies or withholds the term we are inclined to translate as 
"bachelor" with complete confidence to people about whom, it seems, 
he could have no information as to marital status – random strangers in a 
large city, say. Imagine that two hypotheses occur to us.  
Hypothesis (1): Smith uses "bachelor" not with the same meaning we 
do, but as an observational term to be applied on the basis of an observa-
tional gestalt: jaunty step, sharp dresser, air of the bon vivant, etc.  
The Indeterminacy of Translation: Fifty Years Later 387 
Hypothesis (2): Smith means what we mean, but thinks he has some 
clairvoyant insight as to who is and who is not a bachelor.  
Can we, as translators, tell which is the correct hypothesis on the 
basis of the evidence Quine allows? Smith will, of course, make many 
mistakes if we think of him as applying "bachelor" and very few 
mistakes if we think of him as applying something like "stereotypical 
bachelor gestalt." But we can imagine that Smith's behavior in the face 
of "counterevidence" (marriage records, say) is the same on both 
hypotheses. He will be indifferent on the first hypothesis because 
marriage records are irrelevant to the behavioral gestalt. And we can 
suppose that he will be indifferent on the second hypothesis because 
he is so confident of his clairvoyant powers that he assumes the 
counterevidence must be wrong. 
Moreover, it seems that all the questions we could ask to deter-
mine which hypothesis was correct might be similarly inconclusive. 
Suppose we ask, "Are you using "bachelor" as an observational 
term?" Smith might say no even on the hypothesis that he is because 
the existence of the theory/observation distinction is controversial 
and he does not believe in it, because he thinks the term is not obser-
vational except for people with special powers of observation, etc. 
Suppose, then, that we ask, "Do you have special powers?" Smith 
might say yes even on the hypothesis that he is using "bachelor" as on 
observational term because he thinks as before that his application of 
the term requires special powers of observation (not clairvoyance). 
And he might say no, even on the hypothesis that he means by 
"bachelor" what we mean because he is resolutely modest, thinks 
everyone is clairvoyant, etc. And – if we imagine trying to teach 
Smith enough of our philosophy of language, philosophy of science, 
etc., to allow us to discriminate between the two hypotheses, we 
might produce such extreme psychological changes that we would 
have no confidence we weren't changing the meanings of Smith's 
terms – including "bachelor."  
 
Kripke's arguments that (contrary to what Quine assumes) disposi-
tions cannot provide the basis for an account of meaning 
 
Suppose we start with Kripke's famous example designed to 
show that what is involved in our following one rule rather 
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than another cannot be a matter of our dispositions to re-
spond to new cases. 
Plus/Quus Example. Kripke points out that all of our uses of the 
terms"plus" in the past have involved addends less than some finite 
number, say N. And he asks what fact about our past usage makes it the 
case that we were calculating the plus function rather than "quus" de-
fined as follows. For addends both less than N, a quus b = a plus b. Oth-
erwise, a quus b = 5.  (cf. Kripke 1982, 9) 
Kripke gives two arguments that dispositions to behave cannot supply 
the answer.  
Normativity Argument. Dispositions do not capture normativity. Disposi-
tions to answer questions etc, are a matter of what we will do, but 
meaning is a matter of what we should do. (Kripke 1982: 37) This seems 
to generalize since there has (according to Kripke) to be a fact in virtue 
of which we meant plus in the past (if we did), and no fact, according to 
Kripke, could satisfy this normativity requirement. (Kripke 1982: 53; 
cf.John Mackie's "queer facts" argument in Mackie 1977: 38-42).  
Finiteness Argument. We have dispositions to make mistakes, and our dis-
positions are finite, since our brains are finite. If it is said that we should 
look at what we would do if we were given more computational capac-
ity, the reply is that this might not extend our dispositions – we might, 
for example, go insane. (Kripke 1982: 26-27) 
This second argument is not impressive as it stands. The possible 
worlds at which the attempt to augment one's computational capaci-
ties has such dramatically destructive results are, it seems, obviously 
not the relevant ones to look at in characterizing our grasp of the plus 
function. Of course, they might be the "closest possible worlds" in 
some sense, and so in some sense definitive of what would happen if we 
tampered in this way with the brain. For it might simply be the case, 
possibly even a fact of nature, that trying to tinker with the computa-
tional capacities of our brains has destructive results at worlds where 
the physical laws are like the physical laws at this world. But it seems 
intuitively clear that if we are appealing to our behavior at possible 
worlds in order to characterize the concept of addition and what we 
grasp when we think we grasp the rule associated with it, then the 
worlds to consider will be those at which such irrelevant mishaps do 
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not accompany our attempts to idealize away from our finite limita-
tions.  
The problem, then, as Kripke (1982: 28) says explicitly, is really 
one of circularity. Characterizing the relevant possible worlds requires 
that we use the notion of addition. For the relevant worlds to look at 
are the ones at which the steps we take in idealizing away from our 
finite limitations have no irrelevant effects on our dispositions to 
respond to new problems in addition. And what is meant by 'irrele-
vant' in this context? It means, of course, irrelevant to our characteri-
zation of the concept of addition in virtue of being detrimental to our 
ability to add correctly. The relevant possible worlds, then, are the 
ones that introduce no new or special obstacles to our adding correctly.  
Hume's skepticism as an analogue of Kripke's 
There is, I believe, an illuminating analogy between Kripke's argu-
ment and Hume's argument for epistemological skepticism about the 
external world. (Hume 1772: 184) Suppose, as Hume implicitly asks 
one to do, one focuses on what one is immediately given in one's 
perceptual experience – an experience, say, as of a room with furni-
ture, other people, and so forth. In such a case, it will be apparent 
that besides the causal explanation of the experience suggested by 
common sense (that one is in a room with furniture and other peo-
ple), there are many alternative explanations. It might be, for exam-
ple, that one is being misled by an evil demon, that one is a brain in a 
vat, that one is in a virtual reality setup such as The Matrix, etc. Thus, 
according to Hume, there is a logical gap between what one is given 
in perception and any (a posteriori) proposition about the external 
world – a gap that can only be bridged by an inference. Such an 
inference, however, could only be a posteriori, since we cannot 
reason a priori from effects to causes. Thus it could only be justified 
by some justified belief about the connections between our sense 
experiences and their causes in the external world. But, to suppose 
that we have such a justified belief begs the question against the 
skeptic and flies in the face of the fact that all we can get in principle 
is more and more perceptual experience. The conclusion is that we 
can never be rationally justified in preferring any hypothesis about the 
external causes of our perceptual experience over any other. 
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The relevance of Hume's argument to Kripke's discussion of rule 
following becomes clearer when we see that Hume's argument for 
epistemological skepticism leads to a version of meaning skepticism. 
Consider, first, that in order for our words to be meaningful, they 
must – in addition to being associated with other words – be associ-
ated with some extra-linguistic reality to which we have access. On 
the Humean picture, they would get their meanings through associa-
tions with patterns in our perceptual experience. (If I walk around 
this table, I will see...) But the Humean argument for skepticism 
about external objects also applies to sense experience. All we are 
given – all we have access to – are our present experiences (sense-data, 
including those associated with present memories and anticipations). 
Thus our words for external objects (tables, chairs, etc.) have no 
grounding except in our present, actual, solitary, momentary percep-
tual experiences, and this is too thin a basis to ground meaning. 
The conclusion is that there must be some direct perceptions of 
external objects, since this is the only way to block Hume's argument. 
This is in effect a transcendental argument in the sense that it is an 
argument that we can use to counter skepticism by saying that on the 
skeptic's assumptions, we cannot have a meaningful language. Thus it 
is one we can use to depict the skeptic as cutting off the branch on 
which he stands. In this case, the transcendental argument is also an 
argument for Direct or Naïve Realism – the thesis that we are given 
(we perceive) some external objects directly. That is, it is an argu-
ment that sometimes we perceive external objects, and there is 
nothing else we perceive in virtue of which we perceive them. This 
blocks Hume's argument because the latter rests on the assumption 
that there is always a logical gap between what we are given in per-
ception and any a posteriori proposition about the external world. 
And Naïve Realism is the negation of that assumption – that is, it is 
the thesis that sometimes what we are given in perception has logical 
implications for a posteriori propositions about the external world. 
Such experience gives us external objects (conditions, etc.) directly, 
or, to put it figuratively, "takes us all the way out to the world." 
The idea of such direct perception of external objects, then, is 
clearly an attractive one, epistemologically speaking. (And if the 
transcendental argument is right, it is one that we must accept.) But 
we must be able to explain the possibility of the direct perception of 
external physical objects from different perspectives in order to deal 
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with the demonstrative versions of Frege's problem. Consider Evans' 
(1982: 84) example of such a problem. 
Evans' Ship Example. Imagine someone who points out a window to his 
right at the bow of a ship and says, "That ship was built in Japan." He 
then points out a window to his left at the stern of a ship and says, "That 
ship was not." If, contrary to what he assumes, he has pointed to the 
bow and the stern of the very same ship, then he has said obviously in-
compatible things of one and the same object.  
Such a person is ignorant of a fact, but need not be irrational. Thus 
we must do justice to the fact that the same ship has been given to 
him or her from two different perspectives. And we must do so 
without making the Humean assumption (which as we have seen leads 
to meaning skepticism) that what we are actually given (what we see) 
directly are sense-data and that our access to external objects is only 
indirect.  
The explanation I have suggested elsewhere (White 2004) is in 
terms of basic action possibilities and know how. In such cases we know 
how to point to the bow of the ship, how to move closer to it for a 
better look, how to direct someone loading cargo onto the deck of 
the bow etc. The same is true of the stern. But the ship presents 
different basic action possibilities from the two perspectives. Such 
know how, however, does not involve representational intermediar-
ies that could give rise to Humean skepticism. That is, in at least some 
cases, we are given external object’s transparently – not on the basis 
of any sense-data that we are given more directly. The following case 
provides an analogy: Sometimes in a brief glance we are given a 
friend's distress directly – we do not consciously infer it on the basis 
of anything we are given more directly, such as the geometry of his or 
her face or posture, much less on the basis of sense-data. 
The Response to Kripke and Quine  
On the face of it, though, this does not seem to help with Kripke's 
problem, since we do not seem to perceive either meanings or 
mathematical entities like the plus function directly. Direct percep-
tion, however, goes with basic actions, and our basic actions are 
toward the object itself in cases of transparency. We know how to 
compute the plus function. This know how isn't a fact in Kripke's 
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sense – our know how is directed at the plus function itself, so there 
is no fact which is independent of the plus function and which justifies 
our going on in a plus-like way.  
The case of meaning is somewhat different, because – to put it 
figuratively – we look through meanings, not at them. That is to say, 
we manifest our grasp of the meaning in our know how regarding the 
thing meant or regarding things with the feature meant, etc. For 
example, we know how to obey the order, "Paint all the fences," as 
well as the order, "Paint all the white fences." And operating on the 
basis of color can be a basic action – e.g., stopping on red. 
The answer to Kripke's rule-following skepticism, then, is analo-
gous to the answer to Humean skepticism about the external world. 
In the Humean case the answer is that we cannot coherently adopt the 
perspective the skeptic requires us to take – since some objects in the 
external world are given to us directly in perception, we cannot step 
back from all of our external-world commitments simultaneously and 
ask how an inference from our sense-experience (our sense-data) to 
the nature of the external world could be justified. In the case of 
Kripke's rule-following skepticism, the answer is that we cannot step 
back from all the things we mean simultaneously in order to ask what 
fact justifies our moving from the finite number of examples we have 
actually computed to the plus (as opposed to the quus) function.  
As we have seen, one may have no access to the facial geometry of 
one's distressed friend independently of one's seeing the distress (all 
one can say on the basis of the brief glance is that the friend was 
distressed). Analogously, one may have no access to the finite sample 
on the basis of which one learned a concept – the most that one may 
be able to say is that one learned to add.  
The conclusion, however, is actually stronger than this. For we 
couldn't possibly describe the finite samples that Kripke talks about 
independently of our using the concepts Kripke wants to call into 
doubt. For what right do we have to say that in the past we gave the 
answer 4 to 2+2, so any function we were computing must (like plus 
and quus) give the same result in this case? After all, we gave the 
answer 4 on a Tuesday, on a day when it rained, when we were in a 
bad mood, in the past, etc. And there is no reason why a new compu-
tation that will necessarily take place in circumstances that are in 
some respects different has to involve the same answer even for 2+2.  
The point is that our use of concepts is more basic than, and pre-
supposed by, the description of the finite set of examples that is 
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presupposed by the statement of the skeptical problem itself. In this it 
is analogous to the way in which our perception of some ordinary 
external objects is more basic than, and presupposed by, the descrip-
tion of the sensory experiences that is needed to state the skeptical 
problem regarding the external world. 
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Abstract 
The paper examines some of the questions emerging from the debate on 
mindreading regarding Quine's legacy and contribution to a new agenda 
on the issue. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-psychology, a) which 
role folk psychology has to play according to Quine? b) was Quine's ac-
count of mindreading closer to theory-theory, simulation theory or hybrid 
theory? c) was Quine a rationality theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and ra-
tionality theory incompatible as many would suggest? On the score of the 
answers to these questions, the paper tries to suggest a Quinean inspired 
blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-based strategies to explain 
mindreading. 
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Quine and mindreading: is it an oxymoron?* 
How do we understand people? One answer is that we mindread. 
What is mindreading? Roughly, mindreading is the skill of understand-
ing a subject, explaining and/or predicting her thoughts and actions. 
We manage this task attributing to our target a mind, where this 
means ascribing to the target mental states of various kind like per-
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ceptions, beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions. It sounds almost 
obvious that explaining and predicting behavior are capacities essen-
tial to human meaningful interactions, to human cognitive and social 
life. 
Given this definition, it might seem difficult to see what could be 
the relationship between Quine «the behaviorist» and mindreading. 
Isn't Quine, just the Quine of Word and Object, the strongest opponent 
of every form of mentalism? Isn't Quine the strongest opponent of 
any ontological commitment to intentional states? That prima facie 
oddity, I hope, is going to become less strident in what follows.  
The questions that emerge about Quine from the debate on min-
dreading are many. Since mindreading is an exercise in folk-
psychology, a) which role folk psychology has to play according to 
Quine? b) was Quine's account of mindreading closer to theory-
theory, simulation theory or hybrid theory? c) was Quine a rationality 
theorist? d) are hybrid-theory and rationality theory incompatible as 
Nichols and Stich (Nichols and Stich 2003) or Goldman (2006) would 
suggest?  
On the score of the answers to these questions, the paper tries to 
suggest a Quinean inspired blend of rationality-based and hybrid view-
based strategies to explain mindreading. 
In the second section, the main features of the contemporary de-
bate on mindreading are presented. The debate is understood as 
featuring, in the end, two main mutually exclusive options: hybrid-
theory and rationality-theory. In the third section, answers to ques-
tions a) and b) are offered. Quine's argument for the indispensability 
of folk-psychology is reconstructed and his account of mindreading is 
analyzed and identified as a version of hybrid-theory in which simula-
tion plays a major role. Quine's effort, within the framework of his 
naturalized epistemology, in offering a unified account of our under-
standing of world and other people through an examination of per-
ception is considered as a first relevant legacy to the contemporary 
debate on mindreading. It suggests a way of claiming that there is no 
sharp divide between knowledge of the world and knowledge of the 
other minds and overcoming the traditional distinction between 
natural and social science. 
In the fourth section, answers to questions c) and d) are sketched. 
A way to find a reconciliation between rationality and simulation is 
explored through a brief comparison between Davidson and Quine. It 
is meant to argue for the idea that the Quinean inspired hybrid theory 
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based on empathy does not exclude the use of normative notions and 
the appeal to rationality. This is identified as a second relevant legacy 
to the contemporary debate. Taken together, the two legacies men-
tioned above could constitute an interesting agenda for the future 
debate. 
The contemporary debate on mindreading: a very brief 
introduction 
When we ask how we do achieve the complex ability or skill to 
mindread, we find that the contemporary debate features, at least, 
three different theoretical options: theory-theory of mind, simulation 
theory, and rationality theory. 
Each one comes in different sub-varieties. There are at least two 
versions of theory -theory: the child scientist theory (Gopnik and 
Meltzoff 1997; Gopnik, Meltzoff and Kuhl 1999) and the modularity 
theory (Fodor 1987; Leslie 1987, 1988, 1994; Baron-Cohen 1995). 
According to the theory-theory view on mindreading when you 
perform mindreading tasks you use a theory of mind. We have «a rich 
body of mentally represented information about the mind, and [...] 
this information plays a central role in guiding the mental mechanisms 
that generate our attributions, predictions, and explanations.» (Stich 
and Nichols 2003, 239). The two versions mainly differ in their 
answer to the developmental question: how do we arrive to achieve 
the complex skill of mindreading? Is it innate and modular? Or does it 
evolve from childhood to adulthood through radical changes?  
There are also many versions of simulation theory. The core idea 
is that when performing a mind reading task you use a simulation 
routine consisting «in putting yourself in the target's shoes». You 
don't need any kind of theory-like knowledge, you need just the 
ability to project yourself on the target, to engage in a sort of «pre-
tend play» and, using your own belief-formation, desire-formation 
and decision-making mechanisms, to see what comes out. The out-
come of the simulation process counts as the mental state you will 
predict to be that of your target, or you will use to explain its behav-
ior. Among the simulationists, Goldman (2006), Gordon (1986, 
1995, 2005), and Gallese (Gallese 2001; Gallese, Keysers, and 
Rizzolatti 2004) differentiate themselves about the extent to which 
we can say we are using simulation, about the extent of mirroring 
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processes in simulation, and, above all, about the role of introspec-
tion in mind reading. A different perspective on simulation is advo-
cated by Jane Heal (2003), because her approach is characterized by 
the tendency to be conducted in a less empirical and more a priori 
fashion and by the idea that simulation is supported by rationality.  
Notwithstanding these differences between theory-theory and 
simulation theory, it is almost becoming a shared view that a good 
account of mindreading can be afforded by a hybrid view, a blend of 
theory-theory and simulation (Botterill and Carruthers 1999; Stich 
and Nichols 2003, Nichols and Stich 2003; Goldman 2006). People 
who agree on hybrid view have different accounts of the exact step in 
the mindreading process where the hybridization takes place. They 
have also different accounts of which one of the different mindreading 
abilities is subserved by simulation or theory. 
Stich and Nichols (2003, Nichols and Stich 2003) claim that infer-
ence prediction is a mindreading skill subserved by simulation, and 
that desire-attribution and discrepant belief-attribution are mindread-
ing skills that cannot be explained by simulation, but need theory-like 
generalization. 
Goldman distinguishes between two levels of mindreading: low-
level and high-level. He claims that the low-level mindreading skills, 
like emotions recognition, are simulation processes caused by mirror-
ing processes, even though mirroring does not exhaust mindreading. 
Goldman claims that there is a high-level mindreading in which we 
simulate without mirroring. It could be implemented by theory 
(Goldman 2006: 43-46), because it is a kind of simulation in which 
previous experience, knowledge and memory play a major role 
(Goldman 2009). 
If we follow this trend, we might say that just two different op-
tions are left on the field: hybrid view and rationality theory (also 
called interpretativism). The core idea of rationality theory, shared by 
Davidson (Davidson 1984, 2004) and Dennett (Dennett 1987), is that 
mindreading someone is to treat her as rational, namely to attribute 
her mental states such that she comes out as a rational thinker and 
agent. In his book The Intentional Stance, Dennett states: 
However rational we are, it is the myth of our rational agenthood that 
structures and organizes our attributions of belief and desire to others 
and that regulates our own deliberations and investigations. We aspire 
to rationality, and without the myth of our rationality the concepts of 
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belief and desire would be uprooted. Folk psychology, then, is idealized 
in that it produces its predictions and explanations by calculating in a 
normative system; it predicts what we will believe, desire, and do, by 
determining what we ought to believe, desire, and do. (Dennett 1987: 
52) 
According to Goldman (2006: Chapter 3), rationality theory does 
not provide a plausible account of mindreading and it is not compati-
ble with a simulationist account. One of the criticisms offered by 
Goldman is that we cannot find the kind of rationality imagined by 
rationality theorist in actual agents and thinkers. Goldman's argument 
are not new. They are supported by the psychological studies on the 
failure of rationality by Kaheneman, Tversky and others (Kahnerman, 
Slovic, Tvershy 1982).1 
Curiously enough, both theorists like Goldman and rationality 
theorists refer to Quine as a predecessor.2 Goldman himself under-
lines places in Quine's works where he assumes a simulationist stance, 
but he declares that, even if Quine can be viewed as a simulationist, 
no influence of his thought can be traced back in simulationist theo-
rists like himself, Gordon and Heal (Goldman 2006: 18).3 The influ-
ence of Quine on rationality theorists is quite direct and well known. 
Davidson and Dennett both assume the so called principle of charity, 
evoked by Quine (1960:59), as the key rule to interpret others and 
attribute them propositional attitudes. 
 
1 The negative results of these inquiries and their consequences for rationality 
theories have been elucidated and discussed in Thagard and Nisbett (1983) and Stich 
(1983, 1985, 1990). Dennett's answer to this objections is that psychological 
experiments deliberately provoking irrational responses induce a “pathology” 
(Dennett 1987: 52) in a system that, even tough is not perfect, is still “pretty” 
rational (Dennett 1987: 50). 
2 This double aspect of Quine's account have been well noticed by Stich (1983; 
1985) and Dennett (1987). 
3 This assumption is problematic. Goldman, in fact, quotes Quine's passages 
about projecting strategy from Word and Object in his seminal paper on simulation 
(Goldman 1989) 
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Perception, folk-psychology and simulation based hybrid-
theory 
Quine casts many doubts about propositional attitudes and intention-
ality in general. In Chapter VI of Word and Object, emphatically titled 
Flight from intension, in the crucial section 45 titled The Double Stan-
dard, Quine recognizes, with Chisholm and Brentano, that the inten-
tional vocabulary is not reducible, because «there is no breaking out 
of the intentional vocabulary by explaining its members in other 
terms» (Quine 1960: 220). That irreducibility brings as a conse-
quence a refusal of «an autonomous science of intention (Quine 1960: 
221). 
As Quine points out in Word and Object (Quine 1960: 219) and in 
more recent writings, if we look at the idiom of propositional atti-
tudes from the austere ontological point of view of science, we face 
many troubles when we try to include it in our «literal and austere 
formulation of one's theory of the world» (Quine 1989: 351). 
Nonetheless, we don't need to refuse or eliminate the intentional 
idiom.4 In the same section of Word and Object Quine opens the way to 
a different option declaring that he would not «foreswear daily use of 
intentional idioms, or maintain that they are practically dispensable» 
(Quine 1960: 221). In fact, Quine claims that the intentional idiom, 
exemplified by indirect quotation, is not «humanly dispensable» 
(Quine 1960: 218). And he sketches the psychological mechanism 
underlying it that we commonly use: «we project ourselves into what 
[…] we imagine the speaker's state of mind to have been»; we per-
form «an essentially dramatic act» through which we can «find our-
selves attributing beliefs, wishes, and strivings even to creatures 
lacking the power of speech, such is our dramatic virtuosity» (Quine 
1960: 219). 
 
4 Quine’s attitude is, in this respect, different from eliminastivist's project in 
philosophy of mind. Eliminativists like Churchland (1989) claim that folk-
psychology has to be dismissed as a bankruptcy enterprise in favor of scientific 
psychology. Scientific psychology must replace to some extent our common sense 
psychology even in every day usage.  Quine's principle of ontological austerity 
may support such a view. But Quine himself never draws similar consequences 
from his attitude towards folk-psychology. Quite the contrary, he increasingly 
during the decades remarks its role in his account of mind and language. 
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Here we can find a first sketch of the structure of that psychologi-
cal phenomenon Quine, later, would have called «empathy». What is 
empathy according to Quine? It is the ability of a subject to project 
itself on mental states of a target, where projecting means the ability 
of simulating, through imagination, in its own mind the target's 
mental states. 
Even though Quine's reflections on the subject are present as a 
topic in his earlier works,5 a more detailed account and the very use 
of the notion of empathy are to be found in his latest books: Pursuit of 
Truth (1992, Chapters III and IV) and From Stimulus To Science (1995, 
Chapter VIII). Developing the idea that the intentional idiom is not 
«humanly dispensable», Quine claims that the command of mentalis-
tic notion such as 'x perceives that p' seems to be «as old as language» 
(Quine 1992: 61) and that «the handing down of language is imple-
mented by a continuing command, tacit at least, of the idiom 'x 
perceives that p'». Mentalistic idiom intrudes already at the level of 
observation sentences, determining an early bifurcation of physicalis-
tic and mentalistic talk. The bifurcation reminds us that «man is a 
forked animal» (Quine 1992: 62), in Quine's phrase. 
If the learning of language is implemented by the «virtual if not lit-
eral» mastery of mentalistic idiom (Quine 1992: 61), then it is not 
surprising that Quine, in From Stimulus To Science, claims that the 
«perception of another's unspoken thought» by means of instinctive 
empathy is «older than language» (Quine 1995: 89). A confirm of 
that comes, continues Quine, from child psychology: «an infant of 
just a few days old responds to an adult's facial expression, even to 
imitating it by the unlearned flexing of appropriate muscles» (Quine 
1995: 89).6 
 
5 It is worth noticing that the idea that the ability to project oneself in the place 
of another has to play a crucial role in translation does not appear for the first time 
in Pursuit of Truth. It can be found in Word and Object and traced back to The Problem 
of Meaning in Linguistics (Quine 1953) where we can read: «But, as the sentences 
undergoing translation get further and further from mere reports of common 
observations, the clarity of any possible conflict decreases; the lexicographer comes 
to depend increasingly on a projection of himself, with his Indo-European Weltan-
schauung, into the sandals of his Kalaba informant. He comes also to turn increasing-
ly to that last refuge of all scientists, the appeal to internal simplicity of his growing 
system» (Quine 1953: 63). 
6 Quine should be referring to the pioneeristic experiments described in 
Meltzoff and Moore 1977.  
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The explanation for this phenomenon is the instinct of empathy7. 
It works in our ascription of perceptions, for «we all have – Quine 
writes - an uncanny knack for empathizing another's perceptual 
situation, however ignorant of the physiological or optical mechanism 
of his perception» (Quine 1992: 42). 
Empathy is a pervasive phenomenon and – as Quine remarks – it 
«guides the linguist still as he rises above observation sentences 
through his analytical hypotheses, though there he is trying to project 
into the native's associations and grammatical trends rather than his 
perceptions. And much the same must be true of the growing child» 
(Quine 1992: 43).8  
In ascribing to a target that 'Tom perceives that x' we rely on the 
ability to detect his mental state «by the empathetic observation of the 
subject's facial expression and what is happening in front of him» 
(Quine 1992: 62). This ability plays a crucial role both in the field 
linguist case, for he «empathizes the native's perception that a rabbit 
has appeared» (Quine 1992: 62) and in the case of the child language 
learning from his parents. In the latter case, empathy plays a role both 
in child and adult. The child «does not just hear the sentence, see the 
reported object or event, and then associate the two. He also notes 
the speaker's orientation, gesture, and facial expression. In his as yet 
inarticulate way he perceives that the speaker perceives the object and 
event» (Quine 1995: 89).  
The child needs to read, even though in a way, probably not en-
tirely conscious and not even articulated in a theoretical fashion, what 
the adult has in mind. This is also true of the adult who, to give his 
assent to child's utterance, takes note of his orientation and facial 
expression because what he is interested in it is not the «mere truth of 
the utterance» but the fact that «the child has to have perceived its 
truth» (Quine 1995: 89). 
It seems that, according to Quine, what the adult has to evaluate is 
not mere correspondence between world and word, but the fact that 
the correspondence is epistemically established in a reliable way, the 
fact that the adult can make a plausible psychological assumption 
about the child's state of mind. 
 
7 See Rainone (2005, 2010) for a discussion of the role of empathy in Quine. 
8 See note 5. 
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The same mechanism is at play when we try to figure out what 
Tom is thinking. Quine treats this case like an extension of percep-
tion's cases. When we say 'Tom perceives that the train is late', we 
have two ways to understand what Tom is perceiving. Tom can tell us 
about it or we can observe Tom's behavior. He walks impatiently, 
looks at the clock, looks along the track. 
Then, according to Quine, «along with acquiring such habits our-
selves, we have learned to observe similar manifestations on the part 
of others. We are ready to see our own ways replicated in another 
person» (Quine 1995: 63). In the same way as in child case, our 
ascription is based on «projecting [...] into Tom 's situation and Tom's 
behavior pattern, and finds thereby that the sentence 'The train is late' 
is what comes naturally» (Quine 1995: 63). 
As we move away from observation sentences, notes Quine, «as-
cription of perceptions call increasingly for background knowledge 
and conjecture on the ascriptor's part» (Quine 1992: 64). This is 
indeed the case of ascriptions of beliefs. When we ascribe belief our 
evidence is similar to that of when we ascribe perceptions but is 
«usually more tenuous» (Quine 1992: 66). For this reason in ascrib-
ing we need to «reflect on the believer's behavior, verbal or other-
wise», take into account «what we know of his past», and «conjecture 
that we in his place would feel prepared to assent, overtly or cov-
ertly, to the content clause» (Quine 1992: 66). 
Generalizing the case of belief's ascription, Quine remarks that 
«empathy is why we ascribe a propositional attitude by a content 
clause» that is supposed «to reflect the subject's state of mind rather 
the state of things». So we can say that «the quotational account 
reflects the empathy that invests the idioms of propositional attitudes 
from 'perceives that' onward» (Quine 1992: 68-69).  
The conclusion of this line of argument, from an ontological point 
of view, is related with Quine's endorsement of anomalous monism. 
According to that doctrine «there is no mental substance, but there 
are irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events» 
(Quine 1992: 72). Mental predicates interacting one with another 
engendered «age-old strategies for predicting and explaining human 
action», namely folk-psychology. So they «complement natural 
science in their incommensurable way, and are indispensable both to 
the social sciences and to our everyday dealings» (Quine 1992: 72-
73). 
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Let me now summarize and schematize the main features of 
Quine's account of mindreading.  
Quine recognizes that folk-psychology is indispensable to our mu-
tual understanding. He is inclined to treat it as a «practical» compe-
tence (Quine 1992: 46). Its «method» is empathy (Quine 1992: 46). 
Under the label 'empathy' he subsumes many cognitive skills that 
precede language. They can be consciously (i.e. in the field linguists 
case) or unconsciously exercised (i.e. in the learning language child 
case and in the case of many adults' everyday dealings). These skills 
are: a) imitation; b) detection of face expression, orientation, ges-
ture; c) joint attention; d) pretense/imagination. All of these are 
operating in attribution of perceptions which makes possible and 
support communication and language learning. Quine is inclined to 
think that 'perceive that' followed by an observation sentence is «the 
primeval idiom for ascribing a thought» (Quine 1995: 90). We have 
two ways to get the «perception of another's unspoken thought» 
(Quine 1995: 89), i.e. mindreading: a) behavior and b) language. If A 
tries to understand what B has in mind observing her behavior, A's 
activity has the following structure: i.) seeing A's ways «replicated» in 
B's ways, i.e. recognizing similarities between A's behavior and B's 
behavior; ii.) hypothesizing that B's mind is «pretty much like» A’s 
own mind (Quine 1992: 46); iii.) projecting A on B's shoes; iv.) 
simulating B's situation and behavior; v.) seeing «what comes natu-
rally» (Quine 1992: 63). 
The same structure holds when A tries to ascribe to B a belief. The 
crucial difference is that in belief-attribution case the evidence on 
which A bases her attribution is weaker. A's reflections and conjec-
tures and her knowledge of B's background and past become more 
and more relevant. Moreover, in belief-attribution, the «easiest way 
of determining» B's belief is «asking» her (Quine 1992: 66) and 
listening and understanding the «arguments offered in support of a 
belief» (Quine 1992: 67) by B. This obviously implies the use of 
language. 
As far as I can see we are facing again solutions the core of which 
was already present in Word and Object, even though they have been 
growing more explicit in recent years. Quine recognizes the indispen-
sability of mentalistic idiom and identifies in projection, replication 
and simulation, in one word, empathy, the strategies we use in min-
dreading. 
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The analysis of Quine's account of mindreading, in this section, is 
meant to give an answer to some of the questions raised in the first 
section. It gives an answer to question a) about the role of folk-
psychology. What should be remarked is the relevance of what we 
might call the indispensability argument: folk-psychology cannot be 
eliminated. Moreover, it seems that it should be intended mainly as a 
practical form of knowledge, as simulationist would suggest, and not, 
strictly speaking, as a theoretical one. 
It gives also an answer to question b) about Quine and the theory-
theory versus simulation theory debate. Which option is he defending? 
In general, we could say that he is quite near to the hybrid theory, a 
blend of theory-theory and simulation in which simulation plays a 
prominent role. It is clear, even from the reconstruction of Quine's 
thoughts on the topic presented here, that he does not give an in 
depth treatment of the various notions he uses. Readers well ac-
quainted with the contemporary debate on mindreading and social 
cognition can easily see that each of the notions has had a detailed 
treatment in the neuroscientific, psychological and philosophical 
literature of the last three decades.9 Quine envisages a way of putting 
them together, of seeing their relationship, of understanding how 
they can be integrated in a naturalized epistemology10. In fact, 
Quine’s interest on mindreading is part and parcel of his effort to 
answer the crucial question of naturalized epistemology: «how we, 
physical denizens of the physical world, can have projected our scien-
tific theory of that whole world from our meager contacts with it» 
(Quine 1995: 16). He is trying to find a unified account of our under-
standing of the world and other people through an examination of 
 
9 In my reconstruction (third section) I have enlisted four skills for empathy in 
Quine's account: a) imitation ; b) detection of face expression, orientation, gesture; 
c) joint attention; d) pretense/imagination. Excellent studies on imitation are 
included in two volumes edited by Hurley and Chater (2005). On joint attention 
valuable contributes are included in Elian et al. (2005). On pretence and imagina-
tion see Nichols and Stich (2003) and Currie and Ravenscroft (2002). For an 
overview on these issues and their interconnections from a neuroscientific point of 
view see Blackmore and Frith (2003). The various aspects of simulation routine 
(replication, like me, projecting, simulating) have been studied by the simulationist 
theorists I have been quoting in the paper. They play also a crucial role in develop-
mental psychology: Meltzoff (2009), Tomasello (1999). 
10 For an introduction to Quine's naturalized epistemology and its historical 
roots see Zanet (2007). 
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perception11. As far as I can see, he is inclined to think that there is no 
sharp divide between knowledge of the world and knowledge of the 
other minds, as the traditional distinction between natural and social 
science would suggest. This is his first relevant legacy to the contem-
porary debate on mindreading. 
Empathy and rationality 
The second legacy consists in a suggestion that needs to be developed 
about the way to find a reconciliation between rationality and simula-
tion. What follows amounts also as an answer to questions c) and d) 
in the first section. 
Quine seems to suggest there are differences among various men-
tal states' ascriptions and these are differences in degree of the back-
ground knowledge involved. Ascription of perception is the most 
basic, in a double sense. It is the first one we, when we are children, 
exercise and it has a deep influence on our language learning. It is the 
one that calls less for background knowledge and information. To 
ascribe perceptions we need some relevant cognitive skills and exer-
cise empathy. Beliefs ascription and thoughts ascription call for a 
different degree of use of background knowledge and of conjectures. 
The more we want to be successful in ascribing beliefs, the more we 
need to take into account believer's behavior and background 
knowledge. But one may ask what happens when we do not have such 
a knowledge. This is pretty the case of the linguist in the jungle and, 
at least in a certain sense, the case of the adult trying to understand a 
child. In such cases we try to project ourselves starting from our 
common practical knowledge of human psychology. This last consid-
eration brings us to a crucial point. A way of recasting rationality 
versus simulation debate within Quine's philosophy is reflecting on 
the prima facie tension between the principle of charity and empathy. 
That tension comes to the fore when we look to Quine-Davidson 
debate about the issue. 
It is well known that Davidson endorses a version of the principle 
of charity. He claims that a «good theory of interpretation» must 
 
11 I this paper I focalized the theme of perception in Quine for what concerns 
the problem of the other minds. For a more detailed treatment of Quine's theory of 
perception of external world see Zanet (2009). 
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«optimize» agreement, from the interpreter point of view, between 
the interpreter and the subject of interpretation. For «it cannot be 
correct [a theory] that makes a man assent to very many false sentenc-
es» (Davidson 1984, 169). Consequently, Davidsonian interpreter 
should assume the truth of a large part of the subject's beliefs. 
This assumption seems to be a direct consequence of Quine's re-
flections on the same point according to which the “maxim of transla-
tion” underlying our understanding of logical connectives in the 
jungle language is inspired to the commonsense assumption that 
«one's interlocutor's silliness, beyond a certain point, is less likely 
than bad translation -or, in the domestic case, linguistic divergence» 
(Quine 1960: 59). 
According to Davidson the entire theory of interpretation «is built 
on the norms of rationality». When the interpreter applies the theory 
to «actual agents» he «assigns his own sentences to capture the con-
tents of another's thoughts and utterances». This «process necessarily 
involves deciding which pattern of assignments makes the other 
intelligible (not intelligent, of course!), and this is a matter of using 
one's own standards of rationality to calibrate the thoughts of the 
other» (Davidson 2004: 129-30). What are the norms we follow in 
ascribing attitudes? Davidson suggests that «the semantic contents of 
attitudes and beliefs determine their relations to one another and to 
the world in ways that meet at least rough standards of consistency 
and correctness» (Davidson 2004: 114).  
According to Davidson we project our own standards of rationali-
ty on the target of our interpretation. This seems to be a consequence 
of the radical interpretation approach: if we don't have any previous 
knowledge of the subject's language, desires, belief, then we can do 
nothing but projecting our structure of norms. But even if we con-
cede that we can make a clear sense of what kind of rationality stand-
ards we employ, one question is left open: is this the correct picture 
of projection? 
Quine expresses some perplexities about Davidson's picture when 
he writes that in translation what we want to maximize is «not truth 
or agreement with us on the part of the native, but psychological 
plausibility according to our intuitive folk-psychology». And «the 
folk-psychology involved is very much a matter of empathy». (Quine 
1990: 158). We should be ready to attribute animism, in Quine's 
example, to the jungle people even if that belief is not true or not 
rational according to our standards. Quine writes: 
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The translator will depend early and late on psychological conjectures as 
to what the native is likely to believe. This policy already governed his 
translations of observation sentences. It will continue to operate beyond 
the observational level, deterring him from translating a native assertion 
into too glaring a falsehood. He will favor translations that ascribe belief 
to the native that stand to reason or are consonant with the native's ob-
served way of life. (Quine 1992: 46) 
 
The linguist will rely also on observation of the local folkways. The child 
does too, but the linguist is a more seasoned observer. Unlike the child, 
the linguist will not accept everything the native says as true. He will 
indeed assume sincerity, barring evidence to the contrary, but he will 
try as an amateur psychologist to fit his interpretations of the native sen-
tences to the native's likely belief rather than to the facts of circumambi-
ent nature. Usually the outcome will be the same, since people are so 
much alike; but his observation of the folkways is his faltering guide to 
the divergences. (Quine 1995: 80) 
The passages above are pretty clear about the policy that the inter-
preter should follow. He should ascribe belief that “stand to reason” 
for the native, are “consonant” with the native way of life. His inter-
pretation must respond to what is likely for the native to believe in 
consideration of the native's folkways. Trying to fit the interpretation 
of native's belief to his behavior in his natural environment, in his 
ecological niche in Dennett's phrase (Dennett 1987: 49), can give good 
results since we assume that people are alike. But when divergences 
emerge the interpreter's guide is, again, the observation of the native 
and his people way of life.  
It seems that Quine is pointing out a tension between the method 
of truth (or whatever normative notion can play such a role as, for 
example, rational agreement) and the method of psychological plausi-
bility. The former seems to appeal to normative standards predeter-
mined by the interpreter. The latter does not seem to appeal to 
predetermined normative standards: we can say, in a first approxima-
tion, that the standards are negotiated with the contribute of empa-
thetic projection. The crucial consequences that seem to me right to 
take from this is that Quinean interpreter does not deny that some 
normative standards play a role in belief's attribution. He thinks that 
the legitimate question is not just what are the standards we employ 
or should employ in interpretation but we may legitimately ask for 
the standards of who we employ. This is strictly connected to more 
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general questions. What we are interested in when we try to under-
stand people, when we exercise mindreading? How much logicality 
or illogicality, consistence or inconsistence, coherence or incoher-
ence, are we disposed to attribute to the interlocutor? 
In every day cases we are often really good at recognizing a certain 
degree of coherence even in wrong reasoning, or in false ones. If 
what matters is understanding, what we need is not just reveal and 
impute an error to our interlocutor. What we need is to be 'able' to 
follow 'her' flux of reasoning or 'her' chain of actions. Like as in 
Quine's example of animist culture, what matters is not that some-
thing may appear to us as totally irrational for it could be perfectly 
consequent for our interlocutor. And we do not need to speculate a 
lot about jungle people case because adult people who try to make 
sense of children's behavior and beliefs are often facing the same kind 
of situation. If I want to have any chance to understand my son or my 
daughter when they play or ask me something, I have to follow his or 
her chain of reasoning and acting even if they are guided by standards 
quite different from mine adult ones.  
From this point of view, the Quinean inspired hybrid theory based 
on empathy does not exclude the use of normative notions and the 
appeal to rationality. It asks to shift the centre of the evaluations from 
me to you, from us to them. How much we are inclined to do this in 
everyday dealings can be the subject for further valuable psychological 
research and philosophical analysis. A further point I can envisage is 
that the shift can have a noteworthy ethical value for it suggests the 
way for a full blown and wholehearted comprehension of the others, 
even if it asks for a downsizing of the ideal of reason and rationality as 
universal. 
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In the last decades interest in consciousness from within philosophy of 
mind has stepped up enormously and with it the number of compet-
ing theories. Uriah Kriegel offers in his book 'Subjective Conscious-
ness: A Self-Representational Theory' a provoking new naturalistic 
theory that combines the idea, made popular by Brentano, that con-
scious states are about the world but also about themselves with the 
tools of contemporary analytical philosophy.  
Conscious experiences have a subjective dimension, undergoing 
them feels some way; it is like something for the subject to undergo 
them. When I look at the red apple close to my computer, there is 
something it is like for me to have this experience. This is the phenome-
nal character of the experience. Kriegel divides the problem of 
providing a comprehensive theory of consciousness into two different 
ones by identifying a conceptual distinction among two components 
of phenomenal character: the qualitative character and the subjective 
character.  
A theory of qualitative character accounts for what it is like for the 
subject to undergo the experience, the concrete way it feels to un-
dergo it. In this sense the qualitative character is what distinguishes 
the experience I have while looking at my red apple from the one I 
have while, say, looking at a golf course. On the other hand, a theory 
of subjective character explains what it is like for the subject to undergo 
the experience. It abstracts from the particular way having different 
experiences feel and concentrates on the problem of what makes it 
the case that having a conscious experience feels at all. The qualitative 
character is what makes it the phenomenally conscious state it is and 
the subjective character what makes it a phenomenally conscious state 
at all.  
Kriegel regards subjective character as the core of the problem of 
consciousness, because the subjective character provides the existence 
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guishes phenomenally conscious states from other kinds of states. 
Although he offers in chapter 3 an interesting and controversial 
response-dependent representationalist account of qualitative charac-
ter, his main concern is the subjective character of experience and I 
will, therefore, focus on it in this review.  
According to Kriegel's Self Representational theory (henceforth 
SR), a state is phenomenally conscious if it represents itself in the 
right way. Kriegel's master argument for self-representationalism 
comes in three steps:  
The first one goes from subjective character to awareness. Phenom-
enally conscious experiences do not merely happen in me, like the 
beating of my heart, but are also for me. Kriegel maintains that a 
mental state can exhibit this for-me-ness only if I am in some respect 
aware of it. He further suggests that it is plausible that the right kind of 
awareness be also sufficient for a state to be for-me in the relevant 
sense. In such a case, given that a mental state is phenomenally con-
scious if it has for-meness or subjective character, a state would be 
phenomenally conscious if it is a state I am aware of in the right way.  
The second step goes from awareness to representation. This step is 
supported by the following two principles that Kriegel assumes: i) 
being aware of something is a matter of representing it and ii) repre-
senting something is a matter of being in a mental state that repre-
sents it. Accepting them and the result of the previous step one can 
derive the conclusion that a state is phenomenally conscious if it is 
adequately represented by some mental state. This line of reasoning is 
very similar to the one that advocates of Higher-Order Representa-
tional (HOR) theories appeal to. What distinguishes SR from HOR 
theories is the claim that, in the case of phenomenally conscious 
states, the meta-representation is not performed by a numerically 
distinct state. So, in a third step Kriegel offers a collection of argu-
ments against HOR theories of consciousness to conclude that a 
phenomenally conscious state is one that represents itself in the right 
way.  
The idea of self-representation might appear contradictory at first 
glance and in chapter 6 Kriegel makes a laudable effort to make sense 
of it and to make it compatible with naturalistic theories of mental 
content. To this aim, Kriegel introduces the notion of indirect con-
tent and makes use of the mereological distinction between complex-
es and sums. Roughly, the difference between mereological sums and 
complexes is that the way parts are interconnected is not essential for 
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the former but it is for the latter. Kriegel concludes that a phe-
nomenally conscious state, M, is a complex state that has two states, 
M* and M◊, as proper parts, such that M* represents M◊ directly and M 
indirectly in virtue of representing one of its proper parts. M is not a 
mere mereological sum of M◊ and M*, but a mereological complex. 
The difference between HOR and SR rests mainly on this metaphysi-
cal distinction and as one can see in chapter 7 where Kriegel carefully 
explores and presents some interesting evidence from neurosciences, 
he makes similar neurological hypothesis with regard to the brain 
structures that implement phenomenally conscious states as some 
HOR theories do.  
I will now briefly present three worries that, I think, SR left un-
solved.  
In the first place, it doesn't seem plausible that indirect content 
enters the phenomenology and Kriegel fails to make the case in favor 
of it. The problem is that self-representation which determines the 
subjective character depends on the notion of indirect content and 
this is hardly compatible with the claim that subjective character is 
phenomenologically manifest. Kriegel considers this objection and 
tries to resist it:  
My inclination is to contest the claim that the indirect content of a rep-
resentation does not show up in the phenomenology [...] one might be 
tempted to hold that a normal perceptual experience [...] of freshly 
brewed coffee represents the coffee by representing its odor, [...] it 
seems that both are manifest in the phenomenology. However, by the 
light of the principle that only direct content enters the phenomenology, 
the coffee would have to be non-phenomenal. (p.230)  
I disagree. It might well be that the coffee is part of the content of the 
experience, but not part of the content that determines the phenom-
enal character: the coffee itself is not phenomenologically manifest. 
Different substances with the same aroma would give rise to the very 
same kind of experience and even if one concedes that these two 
experiences would differ in content, they do not differ in the content 
that determines the phenomenal character of experience, because, 
taking representationalism for granted, both experiences have the 
same phenomenal character. If I smell the aroma of a substance X I 
have never smelled, seen, nor heard about before, I do not under-
stand how X enters into the experience in the sense of being phenom-
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enally manifest. Just consider another substance Y that has the same 
aroma. The experience one has while smelling X and while smelling 
Y is exactly the same. Therefore, neither X nor Y are phenomeno-
logically manifest despite both being indirectly represented.  
My second worry with Kriegel's proposal is that self-representa-
tionalism seems to be in tension with the phenomenological observa-
tion that motivates the distinction between qualitative and subjective 
character. I agree that all my experiences seems to exhibit a quality of 
for-meness: they are somehow marked as my experiences. That seems 
to suggest, that the experience I have while looking at the red apple is 
about the apple, but also somehow about myself. There is often an 
ambiguity in the use of 'self-representational' (present also in Bren-
tano's writings). The expression 'M is self-representational' can mean 
either i) that M represents itself or ii) that M represents the self. It 
seems to me that the only sense in which M being self-
representational can be said to be phenomenologically manifest is the 
second one: the experience is about both the world and 
the experiencing subject. If this is true, then SR fails to offer an 
account of the subjective character. Kriegel concedes that the phe-
nomenological observation reveals these facts (p.177), but denies that 
they are constitutive of phenomenal consciousness: what is constitu-
tive of a phenomenally conscious mental state is having a content like 
'this mental state is occurring' and not one like 'I am in this mental 
state'. Kriegel suggests that, whereas the experience is self-involving 
in normal human adults, infants' or animals' experiences might fail to 
be so. Unfortunately, he lefts this claim unsupported.  
Finally I want to cast doubts on the idea that self-representation, as 
Kriegel unpacks it, can guarantee sufficient conditions for being a 
conscious mental state; in other words, it is not clear that this condi-
tion cannot be satisfied by non-phenomenally conscious mental states. 
We have mental states that are represented by other mental states 
without thereby giving rise to any phenomenally conscious mental 
state. Consider a state MH that represents ML. Call MNC the aggregate of 
MH and ML and suppose that MNC is a non-phenomenally conscious 
mental state. Why is not MNC a phenomenally conscious mental state? 
The only reply available seems to be that MNC, contrary to M, is not a 
complex and therefore MNC does not represent itself. If we had to 
appeal to M being phenomenally conscious in order to explain the fact 
that M is a complex, then SR would not be illuminating at all. So, 
either there is something in the way that M* and M◊ interact that is 
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different from the way MH and ML interact or SR cannot characterize 
for-meness. According to SR, a mental state is conscious if it is a 
complex that satisfies some further condition (one proper part repre-
sents the other) but unless we are given reasons why a phenomenal 
conscious state like M is a complex and MNC is not, SR cannot be 
considered an account of subjective character, for it fails to explain in 
virtue of what a mental state is a phenomenally conscious mental 
state. In chapter 7, Kriegel hypothesizes that M* and M◊ are connected 
via synchronization of their firing rates. Unfortunately for SR connec-
tion via synchronization of their firing rates seems not to be exclu-
sive of phenomenally conscious states. There is empirical evidence 
suggesting, for instance, that synchronous neurological oscillations 
are a plausible mechanism of medial prefrontal cortex driven cogni-
tive control independent of consciousness. If MH and ML are connected 
via synchronization of their firing rates, then MH and ML are connected 
the same way that M* and M◊ and it still has to be explained why M 
but not MNC  is a complex.  
Kriegel's book is engaging and clear despite the elusiveness of 
some of the notions involved. It offers conceptual tools and argu-
ments worthy of serious consideration for further research and, 
although the theory has some important elements that require further 
elaboration, it presents a compelling alternative in the current debate 
among theories of consciousness. I strongly recommend this book to 
anyone interested in the philosophy of mind and in consciousness in 
particular.  
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This book belongs to the series “New problems of philosophy”, edited 
by José Luis Bermúdez. According to the editor, the aim of the series 
is to provide a clear starting point for the study of a topic of huge but 
 Book Reviews   418 
recent philosophical interest in such a way that it becomes both 
accessible to undergraduate students and of interest to professionals. 
And there is little doubt that Stoljar has written this work having 
clearly in mind this overall aim. 
First, there are many formal aspects of the book that make it read-
er-friendly: chapters are not long (seventeen pages is the average 
length); the book is written in short paragraphs; there are no foot-
notes in the text. Second, contents also follow this same concern: no 
single philosophical position or notion is presupposed; there is a 
glossary of key technical terms at the end of the book; each chapter 
ends with a short summary and a selection of bibliographical recom-
mendations; the argument proceeds slowly, especially in the opening 
chapters; there are useful recapitulations along the way; key philo-
sophical arguments are presented in such a way that both premises 
and conclusion are explicitly displayed.  
Leaving aside the introduction and a first preliminary chapter, the 
book can be divided into three clear-cut parts: 
(1) Chapters 2-5 discuss the first problem of formulation of 
physicalism. 
(2) Chapters 6-8 discuss the second problem of formulation of 
physicalism. 
(3) Chapters 9-11discuss the status of physicalism in light of the 
(skeptical) results of the previous two parts. 
For those ignoring the terminology here, let me make clear what is 
meant by the first and second problems of formulation of physicalism. 
Nowadays physicalism is understood as a metaphysical thesis (it is 
noteworthy that it was not so understood during the times of the 
Vienna Circle, when the term ‘physicalism’ was introduced in the 
philosophical lore –incidentally, Stoljar makes some concise but 
useful historical remarks about the thesis of physicalism, mainly in the 
first chapter) roughly stating that every empirical entity is, or is 
determined by, a physical entity. This is of course very rough and 
vague until one makes clear what are the fundamental physical entities 
in question and in what consists the relation of metaphysical determi-
nation. The first task is what I’m referring to as first problem of 
formulation; the second, of course, is the second problem of formula-
tion. As it happens, these two allegedly preliminary questions have 
proved hard to deal with. In fact, most of the recent philosophical 
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literature arguing for physicalism actually deals with one or both 
problems of formulation. 
It bears mention that Stoljar, our Virgil leading us through the 
depths and complexities of this new and important philosophical 
problem of physicalism, happens to be an outright skeptic about the 
view. His conclusion after discussing the first problem of formulation 
could not be more appalling for the physicalist, I quote: “there is no 
version of physicalism that is both true and deserving of the name” (p. 
90). And the conclusion of the third part is that physicalism does not 
play any crucial role in the main philosophical problems and argu-
ments where it is usually thought to be involved, mistakenly so, of 
course, according to the author. So this is indeed good news for the 
philosopher who tries to make sense of all these recent metaphysical 
discussions but has serious doubts about the cogency of the physicalist 
thesis. But it could not be worse for the physicalist-minded philoso-
pher: in a nutshell, the general conclusion of the book is that 
physicalism is a red herring in many contemporary discussions in 
philosophy of mind, metaphysics and philosophy of science. 
This is however a clever book. In spite of his overt skepticism, 
Stoljar manages to write the book in such a way that, as he unfolds his 
critical argument, he reviews most of the relevant philosophical 
literature on physicalism. Moreover, he proves able to do so without 
dwelling on too many details or ramifications of the discussions, 
which would no doubt make the book much longer and hard to read 
for undergraduates, and therefore unfit for the overall aim of the 
series. 
However skilled and praiseworthy is the presentation, it also has, 
inevitably, its drawbacks. For instance, after concluding, at the end of 
chapter 4, that no version of physicalism is both true and deserving of 
the name, one wonders, from a purely dialectical standpoint,  why 
should we indulge in another row of four chapters dealing with the 
problem of formulating physicalism, once we are told this is a hope-
less enterprise. 
As a philosopher sympathetic with physicalism, there is a wealth of 
points of discussion and criticisms I’d like to raise about Stoljar’s 
skeptical argument, but space limitations recommend austerity here. I 
shall therefore be content if I raise some points concerning the three 
main parts of the book. In doing so, I hope I will give the reader at 
least an inkling of the bulk of Stoljar’s case against physicalism, as well 
as, hopefully so, point to some possible philosophical leaks in the 
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argument which the physicalist may well use to escape Stoljar’s severe 
verdict. 
Let us first concentrate on Stoljar’s discussion of the first problem 
of formulation. In fact, this is the crucial part of his argument. 
Stoljar’s method here does not depart from that of physicalist philos-
ophers. The aim is to find a characterization of the basic physical 
entities which renders a thesis which is plausible and can be properly 
called physicalist. And the way of doing so is to consider possible 
worlds or scenarios in which intuitively physicalism is correct and 
others in which it looks false. The alleged formulation of physicalism 
should then accord well with these intuitions: namely, should come 
out true for the first type of possible scenarios and false for the se-
cond.  
As an illustration of this way of proceeding, consider an elucida-
tion of ‘physical’ according to which by that term we understand the 
sort of entities which feature in commonsense physics, like body, 
mass, and so on. The reason to discard this as part of a good elucida-
tion of physicalism is that the resulting thesis comes out false in a 
possible world in which all empirical entities are, or are determined 
by, the entities introduced by current theories in physics, things like 
spin or charge. This is so because these are definitely not entities 
belonging to commonsense physics. Yet, this is a possible world in 
which physicalism seems to be true. If in the actual world things 
where as described in this scenario, we would then think that 
physicalism is a true thesis. The fact that many physicalists take this 
possible world as being pretty close to the actual one only makes 
things worse. 
A natural move for the physicalist is precisely that of elucidating 
the basic physical entities as those introduced by current physics (see 
Melnyk 2003) or a suitable improvement of it (Lewis 1994). Stoljar 
uses then the same method to discard also this other possible elucida-
tion: he devises a possible world for which the elucidation comes out 
false while intuitively, he claims, it looks like a physicalist scenario. 
This is what he calls the “Twin Physics World” (p. 77). This is sup-
posed to be a world in which “every property is necessitated by twin-
mass, twin-charge and twin-spin”, where these basic properties are 
“assumed to be of a quite different character to mass, spin and charge” 
and furthermore they are not “spiritual nor mental nor conform to 
any paradigm we have of a non-physical property”.  
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Now, it is clear that the formulation of physicalism favored by 
Melnyk or Lewis comes out false for this Twin Physics world. The 
crucial question for this formulation is therefore whether physicalism 
should be judged as being true in the Twin Physics World or not. And 
Stoljar answers unhesitatingly in the affirmative. He seems quite 
confident with this verdict (which, as I read his overall case against 
physicalism, becomes absolutely crucial for his argument), so much so 
that he only offers a consideration, not a full-fledged argument for it. 
This consideration is that “physicalism is supposed to be an abstract 
account of the world, not tied to details of any particular physical 
theory” (p. 78). Yet I’m afraid that a philosopher like Melnyk would 
certainly object to it. 
To see why, let us follow Stoljar’s argument one step further. 
Given that a formulation like Melyk’s (or Lewis’) is to be abandoned 
since it allegedly renders the wrong result with respect to the Twin 
Physics World, it follows according to Stoljar that we need a “more 
abstract” formulation, one which is compatible with such a world. 
Stoljar’s suggestion in this regard is what he calls “the possibilist 
version of the Theory View”, which holds that “F is a physical proper-
ty if and only if F is expressed by a physical theory that is true at some 
possible world or other” (p. 75). So the formulation of physicalism 
proposed will state that every property is or is determined by physical 
properties in the sense of the possibilist version of the Theory View 
(for reasons I cannot dwell into, Stoljar favors formulations of 
physicalism in terms only of properties and not of entities of other 
ontological categories). 
Once we concede to Stoljar this move to the “possibilist version of 
the Theory View” formulation of physicalism, we are only one step 
away from his skeptical conclusion, since this formulation will cer-
tainly prove to be too liberal as it is compatible with overtly 
antiphysicalist scenarios, such as those in which everything is deter-
mined by entities introduced by some future physics which includes 
consciousness as one of the basic entities. 
Yet, as announced, I think there is good reason to resist Stoljar’s 
move to “possibilist physicalism” (let us call it so by way of abbrevia-
tion). Stoljar is well aware that physicalism is intended to be a contin-
gent thesis, and this thought will certainly loom large in his discussion 
of the second problem of formulation, along chapters 6 to 8 (inci-
dentally, chapter 7 contains a very clear and useful discussion of the 
intricate issue of the modal status of physicalism). But, during his 
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discussion of the first problem of formulation, he seems however to 
overlook that physicalism is also intended to be an empirical thesis, in 
the sense that it is intended to be a thesis for which we have not 
merely possible but actual empirical evidence. In other words, the 
physicalist’s reasons, her reasons to defend physicalism, are empirical 
reasons in the first place. 
Now one wonders what kind of empirical evidence we have for a 
thesis formulated as possibilist physicalism. What sort of actual em-
pirical evidence might we have concerning entities for which we do 
not have the slightest notion? This is why I’m afraid that a philosopher 
like Melnyk would, pace Stoljar, refrain from accepting a formulation 
such as possibilist physicalism and would instead happily accept a 
formulation of physicalism which is incompatible with the Twin 
Physics World. 
Still, one can find this move also undesirable, and think that some-
thing like Twin Physics World should be a physicalist world after all. 
One could also endorse Stoljar’s view that physicalism should not be 
conceived as a thesis inextricably tied to a particular physical theory. 
But we should bear in mind that whatever formulation of physicalism 
we propose which honors these considerations should be a thesis for 
which certain actual empirical evidence can be provided. This is 
certainly not a simple task, and seems to trap us in the two horns of 
the notorious Hempel’s Dilemma. So it is Stoljar’s inference from the 
truth of physicalism in the Twin Physics World to possibilist 
physicalism which looks problematic to me. 
In chapter 5 of his book, Stoljar argues that his skeptical argument 
is actually stronger and better than Hempel’s Dilemma. For the 
reasons just unveiled, I think that precisely the opposite is actually the 
case. The problem in a nutshell is to find a formulation of physicalism 
abstract enough, to use Stoljar’s words, but also one for which actual 
empirical evidence can be provided. I myself have suggested a formu-
lation of physicalism which partly rests on a mereological principle 
according to which properties of wholes are determined by properties 
of their constituents. The key here is that we seem to have a wealth of 
empirical evidence for such a general principle (for details, see Pineda 
2006).  
Let me now say something about Stoljar’s discussion of the second 
problem of formulation. The treatment given in the book to the 
recent work on the notion of realization is simply too cursory. Stoljar 
is simply not interested in this. Maybe a good indication of this is the 
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persistent mistake in the description of Shoemaker’s analysis of reali-
zation. This occurs twice in the book (on pages 125 and 155) and in 
both cases it is said that, according to the analysis, the causal powers 
of the realizer are included in the causal powers of the realized, when 
in fact it is the other way around. Also the discussion of the functional 
analysis of realization, defended by Melnyk among others, on pages 
123-4, is too quick to say the least. 
This dismissal of what many physicalist-minded philosophers take 
to be the most novel and interesting work on the matter in recent 
years is symptomatic, I think, of an aspect of Stoljar’s conception of 
the thesis of physicalism which is open to critique. Let me explain. 
Stoljar defends that the notion of physicalist determination should 
simply be elucidated as that of metaphysical necessitation. So accord-
ing to this what the physicalist has in mind is roughly that for every 
property F instantiated at the actual world, there is some physical 
property G instantiated at the actual world such that, for all possible 
worlds w, if G is instantiated at w, then F is instantiated at w (p. 
112).  This of course has the problem of not ruling out necessitation 
dualism, the view according to which psychological and physical 
properties are metaphysically distinct yet necessarily connected. 
Stoljar’s reaction to that is the suggestion that necessitation dualism 
might be incoherent, if metaphysical distinctness entails only contin-
gent, but not necessary, connections. Yet he acknowledges that this 
response may not be very convincing. And he acknowledges also that 
the defender of a realization formulation of physicalism is in a better 
position here, since she definitely can rule out necessitation dualism. 
Now I disagree with Stoljar’s views here. Moreover I think that 
there is something fundamentally wrong in his whole treatment of the 
notion of physicalist determination. To begin with, realization 
physicalism is attractive not merely because it rules out cases such as 
necessitation dualism, but because it tries to elucidate why the non-
physical occurs in virtue of the physical, according to the physicalist. 
Physicalism is not merely a theory about necessary connections 
among empirical entities; it is rather an explanatory theory. The 
claim is that everything empirical in the actual world occurs in virtue 
of the physical. An analysis of realization just wants to elucidate this 
admittedly unclear ‘in virtue of’. 
Stoljar discusses, again very quickly, this view of physicalism as en-
tailing an explanatory relation between the empirical in general and 
the physical. But he dismisses it altogether on the grounds that “it is 
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quite unclear that the physicalist must, of necessity, require that there 
is an explanation of why the necessitation relation obtains” (p. 156). 
But of course she must, otherwise there would be a basic metaphysi-
cal fact –the necessary connection between physical and non-physical 
entities—which would not be entirely physical. Yet surely 
physicalism entails that all basic metaphysical facts are entirely physi-
cal. 
To conclude, let me just say a word about the third part of the 
book. After having dismissed physicalism, in the third part of the 
book Stoljar tries to argue that this is no serious loss. According to 
him, physicalism is a sort of philosophical Weltanschauung. Stoljar 
seems to conceive of physicalism as something akin to what Thomas 
Kuhn dubbed a ‘paradigm’, only that physicalism is supposed to be a 
paradigm in philosophy, not in science. As a Kunhian paradigm, the 
main attraction of physicalism is, according to Stoljar, that it sets out 
‘normal problems’ (Stoljar speaks of ‘placement problems’, he never 
mentions Kuhn, though it looks as it is that what he has in mind) for 
the philosophical community to resolve, namely, how to account for 
certain philosophically intriguing notions, like consciousness or 
intentionality, in terms compatible with the general physicalist thesis. 
Consequently, the bulk of the third part of the book is to argue, 
going case by case (although only the consciousness case is discussed 
with some depth), that physicalism is not essentially involved in any 
of these problems and philosophical discussions. So then the outright 
dismissal of physicalism, Stoljar finally concludes, does not involve 
any real loss of significance for current philosophical discussions. 
Admitting that all this is very suggestive and interesting, I think 
that it is again misconceived in an important sense. For once again the 
empirical and explanatory character of physicalism is overlooked. 
Stoljar’s view on physicalism seems so to speak very philosophically 
endogamic. The focus is on the role of physicalism in certain philo-
sophical arguments and positions. But in fact there seems to be em-
pirical evidence for physicalism which is quite independent from the 
role of physicalism in philosophical arguments. It is rather evidence 
revealed by the actual proceedings of current science. If you ask to 
the layman about the nature of a mental state (I’ve actually done that) 
the most common answer is that it is a brain state. Although this view 
may not be entirely correct, it is in any case a view which relies on 
empirical evidence. The psychiatrist deals with a depression by pre-
scribing certain drugs affecting the workings of certain neurotransmit-
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ters; the neurologist deals with the Parkinson disease by prescribing 
drugs which try to restore the correct distribution of dopamine in the 
brain, and so on. As Jerry Fodor once made clear, typically when a 
special science law faces an exception the scientist descends one level 
down to look into the laws governing the realizers in order to account 
for the exception and deal properly with it. This is the sort of empiri-
cal evidence which points to something like physicalism. So the 
dismissal of physicalism, irrespective of what turns out to be the case 
with current philosophical discussions, should be accompanied with 
the formulation of an alternative theory that can equally account for 
all this considerable amount of empirical data. This is what I’m afraid 
is entirely missing in Stoljar’s otherwise excellent discussion of 
physicalism. 
David Pineda 
Universitat de Girona 
david.pineda@udg.edu 
